Japan’s foreign minister, Toshimitsu Motegi, and Philippine foreign minister Enrique Manalo L. L. L. Lazaro signed a new Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) in Manila on January 15, formalizing arrangements for tax-free exchange of fuel, ammunition, food and other supplies during joint training and operations. Tokyo framed the pact as a way to strengthen disaster response and interoperability with the Armed Forces of the Philippines, but U.S. and regional observers see it as another step in deepening security ties that could enhance deterrence against China in the East and South China Seas.
The agreement must still be ratified by Japan’s legislature to take effect. It follows a Reciprocal Access Agreement between Japan and the Philippines that entered into force in September 2025 and comes amid ongoing talks to deepen military intelligence sharing. At the signing, Japan also pledged roughly $6 million in “government security assistance” to Manila to build facilities for hard-shell inflatable boats Tokyo has donated and disclosed that a Japanese-funded coastal radar system arrived in the Philippines on January 14. Tokyo said it is also discussing the possible transfer of multi-role response vessels.
Japanese officials stressed that Tokyo and Manila agreed to oppose unilateral changes to the status quo by force or coercion in the East and South China Seas and highlighted the importance of Japan–U.S.–Philippines trilateral cooperation. Manila described Japan as a “vital strategic partner” and emphasized the mutual interest in preserving freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea, a point that resonates with Southeast Asian states wary of any single power asserting control over contested waters.
Beijing’s state-linked Global Times framed the pact skeptically, arguing that “disaster cooperation” is being used to mask forward military deployments and warning that closer Japan–Philippines defense ties risk creating bloc politics that undermine regional stability. A Chinese scholar quoted in the piece reiterated Beijing’s pledge to defend its territorial and maritime claims and urged ASEAN-centered security mechanisms as an alternative to exclusive security frameworks.
Operationally, an ACSA-style logistics arrangement matters because it reduces administrative friction for combined exercises and contingency operations. By permitting tax- and duty-free resupply, such pacts make it easier to sustain more frequent and more complex drills, pre-position consumables during humanitarian missions, and shorten logistics timelines if crises unfold. When combined with coastal radar, donated boats and prospective vessel transfers, the agreement signals a practical deepening of Japan’s security footprint in the Philippines short of basing arrangements.
The agreement will test Manila’s balancing act between expanding security options with Japan and the United States and managing economic and diplomatic ties with China. For Tokyo, the pact advances a long-standing policy to enable Japan to play a more proactive role in regional security while remaining within the legal and political constraints of its postwar constitution. For Washington, Japan–Philippines interoperability is a force multiplier that supports U.S. interests without requiring U.S. forces to shoulder all operational burdens. For Beijing, the move will be read as part of a broader network of partnerships that collectively constrain its maritime ambitions, and it may prompt calibrated responses ranging from diplomatic protests to increased maritime activity.
Looking ahead, the agreement’s practical effects hinge on Japan’s legislative approval, the pace of implementing coast-radar and vessel transfers, and whether Manila signs further intelligence-sharing or logistics accords. The dynamic underscores how logistics and equipment pacts—often presented as technical or humanitarian—have become key instruments in the strategic competition over Asia’s maritime commons.
