Germany’s defence minister, Boris Pistorius, announced on 20 January that the Bundeswehr’s active ranks have risen to about 184,200 personnel — the largest force level in 12 years and the highest intake since conscription was suspended in 2011. The declaration forms part of an energetic German effort to rebuild conventional capabilities after years of underinvestment and the strategic shock of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The manpower rise comes alongside ambitious budgetary plans that have already been put on a new footing: a constitutional change in 2025 loosened limits on defence borrowing and Berlin is expected to set a defence budget of roughly €108 billion in 2026, rising toward core defence spending of about €152.8 billion by 2029, the level needed to hit NATO’s 3.5 percent of GDP target. Those figures reflect a sustained political will in Germany to translate rhetoric about strategic autonomy and European burden‑sharing into real resources.
But there are awkward contrasts. A January report that 15 German soldiers stationed briefly on Greenland were withdrawn two days after arrival has been picked up as a telling anecdote. The episode undercuts high‑profile claims that Germany will become the “strongest conventional force in Europe” and highlights operational, logistical and political limits to rapid force projection in remote theatres.
Numbers alone do not equate to combat power. Recruiting is only the first step: training pipelines, qualified non‑commissioned officers and officers, modern equipment, sustainment and realistic exercises all take time and money. Germany’s long‑term challenge will be to convert headline personnel figures and budget lines into coherent, deployable capabilities — especially in niche domains such as Arctic operations, cyber and air‑defence.
The domestic German effort is part of a broader Franco‑German and EU conversation about a permanent European force and greater strategic autonomy from the United States. Berlin’s moves reduce Europe’s dependence on American reassurance, but they also risk duplicating capacities and raising friction with NATO planning unless coordinated allied frameworks and burden‑sharing are clarified.
For now the signal is mixed: Germany is investing and recruiting at a scale not seen in over a decade, yet recent operational hiccups show that political ambition still needs to be matched by doctrinal clarity, industrial expansion and tested logistics. How effectively Berlin sustains these investments, integrates them with NATO and EU partners, and reforms personnel systems will determine whether the Bundeswehr becomes the dependable backbone of European deterrence its leaders envision.