On 22 January, the commander of Iran’s Hatam al‑Anbiya Central Command issued a stark warning: any attack on Iranian territory, security or interests would “immediately and primarily” convert all U.S. interests, bases and centers of influence into legitimate and explicit targets. He told foreign audiences that Washington was “well aware” of the consequences of any miscalculation, and vowed that Iran’s response would be faster, more precise and more destructive than the United States and Israel expect.
The statement, carried in Chinese media, is consequential less for novel military capability than for its legal and strategic framing. By declaring a blanket right to strike U.S. assets in response to attacks on Iranian soil, Tehran is expanding the notion of what it would consider a lawful retaliation, moving the debate beyond the immediate battlefield to a broader, potentially global set of assets and interests.
That formulation alters the deterrence calculus. U.S. forces are dispersed across the Middle East — in the Gulf, Iraq and elsewhere — and are backed by critical logistics and basing arrangements with regional partners. Iran’s public renunciation of geographic limits raises the political and operational stakes for any future confrontation, increasing the risk that an incident intended as a limited strike could trigger a wider exchange.
The declaration also functions as signaling on multiple fronts: to the United States, to Israel and to Tehran’s regional proxies. It is at once a deterrent message aimed at dissuading strikes, a reassurance to domestic and allied constituencies that Iran will defend its sovereignty, and a warning to proxies and partners that Tehran reserves the right to escalate beyond local theaters. The commander’s emphasis on speed, precision and destructive effect suggests an intent to stress asymmetric options — missiles, drones, cyber and proxy networks — rather than doctrine reliant on a symmetrical force-on-force exchange.
For international policymakers the statement complicates crisis management. Washington must balance deterrence, force protection and alliance reassurance without validating a spiral that Tehran has explicitly invited. The practical effect will likely be heightened alert levels at U.S. installations, more robust defensive postures among regional partners, and renewed diplomatic urgency to erect backchannels for de‑escalation. Absent such efforts, the public broadening of legal and operational targets increases the probability that a localized incident could metastasize into a wider confrontation.