On January 25, a member of Iran's parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, Muhsini Sani, announced that the Islamic Republic's armed forces had entered a state of full readiness in response to what Tehran described as adversary military deployments. Sani said Iran's military was watching "all hostile movements" in the region and had its "finger on the trigger," warning that any infringement would be met with a fierce response.
Iran's warning framed the Strait of Hormuz as a decisive geostrategic lever, with Sani asserting Tehran could use control over the chokepoint to manage and repel external military provocations. He added that any Iranian retaliation would extend from the Hormuz Strait to "all U.S. interests" in the region and would exceed adversaries' expectations in scale and method.
Another commission member, Vahid Ahmadi, dismissed U.S. and Israeli threats as psychological warfare aimed at masking reluctance to fight, and warned that strategic miscalculation by Washington would invite "destructive" strikes on U.S. bases in the region and on Israel. Ahmadi also rejected President Trump's talk of negotiations, saying Tehran would not be lured into talks with a partner it deems untrustworthy and prone to striking during dialogue.
The statements come amid a visible U.S. military buildup in the Middle East. Washington has said it is dispatching a "large fleet" and additional missile-defence assets to the region, including at least one aircraft carrier, as tensions with Tehran have climbed. The resulting standoff raises the risk of miscalculation with implications for regional stability, global energy markets and the security of allied forces and commercial shipping.
Background events that inform the current exchange include years of confrontation between Tehran and Washington, escalatory incidents in Gulf waters and the broader contest between Iran's asymmetric arsenal and U.S. force projection. Control of the Strait of Hormuz is especially consequential: even limited disruptions there can sharply affect oil flows, insurance costs and the strategic calculations of Gulf states and Europe, which have a strong interest in de‑escalation.