On January 23 the Pentagon published its 2026 National Defense Strategy, signalling a recalibration of American military priorities that has unsettled allies from Europe to Latin America. The document places defending the U.S. homeland and securing control of “key regions” in the Western Hemisphere—explicitly naming Greenland, the Gulf of Mexico and the Panama Canal—at the top of the list, while demanding that partners shoulder a greater share of regional defence responsibilities.
The report’s language is unmistakably transactional. It promises to preserve American access for military and commercial actors across the hemisphere and to use “force rather than confrontation” to deter China in the Indo‑Pacific, but it stops short of naming Taiwan. At the same time it calls for a major industrial boost at home so U.S. forces remain ready to act decisively, effectively trading some overseas commitments for hardened capacity closer to American shores.
European capitals reacted with alarm. The strategy downgrades Europe’s economic weight in Washington’s calculus and frames threats from Russia as “sustained but controllable” in the near term, implying that NATO members should lead on challenges that more directly affect them. Comments in the report about a “non‑American NATO” and repeated references to Greenland fuel fears that the United States is willing to strip back its frontline roles in Europe unless allies increase spending and initiative.
In Latin America and among neighbouring states, the shift looks less like retrenchment and more like a renewed, muscular focus. The report reinterprets Monroe Doctrine sensibilities, pledging robust U.S. control over strategic corridors and warning that Washington will act decisively if partners fail to defend shared interests. That posture—paired with rhetoric about countering “drug terrorists” and maintaining access from the Arctic to South America—has rattled governments that fear renewed interventionism rather than partnership.
On the Indo‑Pacific, the language is nuanced but strategic: China is not presented as the single overriding threat, nor is Taiwan explicitly referenced, yet the strategy emphasises deterrence by denial and continued military dialogue with Beijing to reduce risks. Analysts read this as an attempt to freeze the current balance of power while protecting U.S. advantages, even as American practice—arms sales and security partnerships—continues to shape regional dynamics.
The plan has immediate implications for force posture and alliance politics. Seoul may face a gradual drawdown of U.S. combat power in favour of a model where South Korea assumes primary deterrence responsibilities with limited American support. European NATO members confront a tougher‑minded Washington that will demand leadership and burden‑sharing. Latin American governments must decide whether to accommodate a U.S. hemisphere‑first strategy or resist perceived infringements on sovereignty.
Chinese scholars and commentators framed the document as consistent with an ‘America First’ worldview: a restructuring designed to preserve relative U.S. dominance while economising global commitments. Whether the strategy marks strategic realism, tactical reallocation of scarce resources, or a more assertive regional hegemony depends on implementation—budget choices, basing decisions and how often Washington chooses unilateral action over alliance diplomacy.
The report thus poses a question the next years must answer: will the United States translate this blueprint into a sustainable, coalition‑based security architecture, or will the pressure it exerts on allies widen rifts that adversaries can exploit? The practical test will be whether partners respond with deeper cooperation and investment, or recoil from a U.S. that is both demanding and ambiguous about its long‑term global role.