UK Budget Strain Forces Delay in Japan–UK–Italy Sixth‑Generation Fighter Deal, Jeopardising 2035 Goal

A planned contract to move the Japan–UK–Italy sixth‑generation fighter programme into full development has been delayed because the UK has not finalised its funding amid rising defence bills. The pause risks derailing the partnership’s 2035 deployment target, forcing national workstreams and raising coordination, cost and capability risks for all three partners.

Powerful military aircraft soaring against a calm blue sky.

Key Takeaways

  • 1The trilateral contract for the Global Combat Air Programme (Japan, UK, Italy) due by end‑2025 has been postponed because the UK has not settled its contribution.
  • 2Britain’s expanded rearmament plan — including nuclear warhead work, submarines, ammunition factories and troop increases — has driven up costs and created a reported £28bn shortfall.
  • 3Without a central contract, the partners will resort to national procurement contracts, increasing coordination costs and threatening the programme’s 2035 deployment target.
  • 4The delay underscores wider geopolitical dynamics: US pressure for higher European defence spending and the risk that budgetary strain will fragment multinational capability projects.
  • 5The programme can be salvaged if the UK finalises its investment plan in the spring and partners recommit to centralised contracting and pooled schedules.

Editor's
Desk

Strategic Analysis

This delay exposes a core tension in contemporary allied military procurement: the strategic need for pooled, high‑cost capability development collides with domestic fiscal realities and shifting political priorities. The UK’s predicament — forced to reconcile ambitious force‑structure goals with constrained public finances — illustrates how even committed partners can stumble at the funding stage, leaving industrial consortia without the legal authority or cash flow to progress. For Tokyo, which seeks technological autonomy from US platforms, the risk is a postponed or compromised capability; for NATO and Washington, the episode offers leverage but also warns that pressuring allies to spend without accounting for long procurement timelines can undermine cooperative programmes meant to broaden the defence industrial base. Watch the UK spring decisions: they will signal whether multilateral defence innovation can survive short‑term budgetary politics or will give way to a patchwork of national solutions that are costlier, slower and less interoperable.

China Daily Brief Editorial
Strategic Insight
China Daily Brief

A trilateral programme to develop a sixth‑generation fighter with Japan, the United Kingdom and Italy has been forced off schedule after London failed to pin down its contribution. The contract that would shift the project from planning into full development — to be signed between the three governments’ co‑ordinating body and a jointly owned industrial vehicle — was due by the end of 2025 but is now unlikely before Britain settles its defence investment plan.

The partnership, known in Chinese as the Global Combat Air Programme and organised through an intergovernmental body and a joint venture (referred to in Chinese sources as “尖翼公司”), was launched in 2022 with an ambitious target of initial deployment around 2035. Signing the contract would have authorised centralised management, pooled funding and a single development timeline. Without it, Tokyo, London and Rome are expected to default to separate, national contracts with their domestic primes — a route that will complicate coordination, raise transaction costs and increase the risk of schedule slippage.

The proximate cause of the pause is domestic pressure in Britain. Under President Trump’s public push for allies to raise defence spending and with the war in Ukraine underscoring European vulnerability, the UK has embarked on an expansive rearmament programme covering new nuclear warheads, ballistic missile submarines, ammunition production and larger troop numbers. As detailed costing has progressed, the government’s projected bill has ballooned and officials concluded that even reaching NATO’s 3.5% of GDP “core” spending target by 2035 would not cover the package.

Treasury strain is acute: British officials reportedly face a £28 billion shortfall in the ten‑year defence plan and have postponed the publication of their investment priorities, initially expected in autumn 2025, until spring. That delay effectively makes it impossible for London to commit the sums needed to sign the trilateral fighter contract on the original timetable. Until funding lines are finalised, the intergovernmental organisation and the joint venture cannot be authorised to contract or to lead unified development work.

For Japan the setback is particularly awkward. Tokyo signed up to GCAP in part to secure access to advanced technologies and to keep its procurement timetable independent of US platforms such as the F‑35. A fragmented approach would leave Japan exposed to higher costs, potential gaps in capability and the prospect of buying interim solutions if the shared development drifts beyond the 2035 horizon. Italy, smaller in budgetary terms, stands to be squeezed: national suppliers could see their participation delayed or diluted.

The pause also contains a geopolitical message. Washington’s renewed pressure on European partners to spend more is reshaping how allies plan capability development. If European budgets tighten, NATO members may prioritise national rearmament and deterrence projects over costly, long‑term multinational technology programmes. That would play into the hands of US defence firms and Washington’s own strategic choices, while complicating allied attempts to field a truly non‑US sixth‑generation option.

Industrial risks multiply if centralised contracting is postponed. Multinational programmes are designed to harmonise standards, share supply chains and keep sovereign skills in play; piecemeal national contracts can fragment technical specifications, prolong testing and increase the chance that elements of the programme become incompatible or redundant. Delivering a cutting‑edge fighter requires sustained investment and political patience — commodities that appear in short supply.

The project is not dead. If London finalises its investment plan and identifies savings without gutting key programmes, the partners can still sign a contract and preserve the 2035 ambition. For now, however, the delay highlights the fragility of multilateral defence cooperation in an era of competing domestic priorities and expanding geopolitical tension. The UK’s spring budget and a renewed diplomatic push among the three capitals will determine whether the programme regains forward momentum or fractures into national efforts.

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