China’s foreign ministry on 27 January sharply rebuked Japanese prime minister Sanae Takaichi after she said Tokyo and Washington might act together to evacuate citizens if a crisis broke out in the Taiwan Strait. Spokesman Guo Jiakun told reporters that "neither historically nor legally" does Japan have any qualification to meddle in China’s Taiwan, invoking a string of post‑war treaties and communiqués to buttress Beijing’s position.
Guo cited the 1972 China–Japan Joint Communiqué, the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, and wartime documents including the Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Proclamation to argue that Taiwan is Chinese territory and that Japan carries obligations arising from its wartime conduct. He also reminded audiences of Japan’s post‑war demilitarisation and accused Tokyo’s current rhetoric of being at odds with its own legal commitments while echoing calls for Japan to fully disarm the industries that could enable remilitarisation.
Takaichi’s comments — that Japan would not abandon a long‑standing ally and might join the United States to rescue nationals — reflect Tokyo’s increasingly assertive security posture and the closer operational alignment between Washington and Tokyo. Beijing framed those remarks as evidence of a resurgent Japanese right wing exploiting regional tensions to press for "remilitarisation," a move it says threatens the political basis of Sino‑Japanese relations and regional stability.
The exchange underlines a widening chasm between the two neighbours at a moment when the Taiwan Strait is a focal point for strategic competition. For Beijing, Tokyo’s public willingness to contemplate action near Taiwan risks normalising third‑party intervention in what the People’s Republic defines as an internal matter; for Tokyo, ambiguity about evacuation or contingency operations feeds domestic pressure to clarify defence policy in an era of great‑power rivalry.
Beyond bilateral rancour, the episode matters for Washington and other regional capitals that rely on predictable rules of engagement. Increased rhetorical and legalistic contestation over Taiwan raises the prospect of miscalculation in a crisis, complicates deterrence calculations, and could accelerate political momentum in Japan toward deeper security cooperation with the United States and a more robust defence posture of its own.
History also casts a long shadow. Guo’s invocation of Japan’s colonial rule of Taiwan and its wartime crimes is meant for both domestic and international audiences: it ties contemporary disputes to unresolved grievances and frames Tokyo’s security ambitions as a challenge to the post‑war order. The net effect is to harden positions on both sides and make diplomatic space for de‑escalation narrower unless Tokyo and Beijing take deliberate steps to dial down public confrontation.