On the evening of 18 January an investor in Shenzhen wired RMB 110,000 through a jewellery mini‑program to buy gold. The platform showed more than 3,000 people in front of him in the withdrawal queue; the money only showed as received in the system the next morning. By 20–21 January, thousands of users nationwide reported they had been blocked from trading or from withdrawing funds, while short videos and chat groups spread claims of a run on the platform.
Customers say the owner is Shenzhen JiewoRui Jewellery, a former gold‑material wholesaler from the Waterbei trading district that has in recent years moved into retail and high‑leverage pre‑sale pricing products. Investors who spoke to local media and compiled spreadsheets report unresolved balances running into the billions of yuan; one investor sheet tallied RMB 13.392 billion in outstanding user balances, while a separately submitted, partial real‑name audit counted RMB 246 million as of 27 January. Local police and regulators have begun inquiries, and Luohu district authorities in Shenzhen say they have formed a working group to press the company to sort assets and communicate with investors.
The story of how a materials dealer became the centre of a nationwide payout squeeze is straightforward and cautionary. JiewoRui used social media to recruit retail clients into a “pre‑sale” pricing model in which buyers paid small deposits to lock future delivery prices for gold and silver. Because deposits were tiny relative to the notional exposure, the product offered private investors leverage reportedly as high as 40x on gold and smaller but still significant leverage in silver. That high gearing fuelled rapid retail growth but also left the platform exposed when prices moved sharply.
Users describe the mini‑program product mechanics as simple to pitch but opaque in practice. A customer could “lock” one gram of gold with a deposit of around RMB 20–100 depending on the app and timing; for 100 grams that could amount to a deposit of only a few thousand yuan while the full exposure equalled many tens of thousands. For context, margins for regulated exchange gold contracts are a far higher fraction of notional exposure. The tiny upfront cost amplified both gains and losses for small investors and concentrated counterparty risk inside the platform.
JiewoRui’s online operations were split across several mini‑programs — the parent jewellery storefront plus “Longyejin” and “Jincheng Jingshi” — that allowed internal transfers of account balances and stored metal inventories. Investors say the company promoted fee waivers, reward points and buyback guarantees to move customers from simple retail sales into leveraged pre‑sale trading. The firm also introduced white silver pre‑sale products as silver prices surged, raising margin and liquidity pressures further.
When withdrawals began to lag, the company limited daily cash and gold payouts to RMB 500 or 1 gram. It later proposed concrete remedies that, if accurate, would crystallise large losses: either an immediate settlement at 20% of principal or a 12‑installment schedule at 40% of principal. The “principal” in these offers reportedly excludes earlier consignments and recycled metal that customers had mailed in, meaning that physically delivered metal may not be counted in the redemption pool.
Industry observers and victims point to several structural faults. The product combined aggressive social‑media marketing with an opaque risk‑management model and non‑segregated client funds. The platform reportedly claimed to hedge exposures in overseas markets, but such offshore hedges are difficult to verify and create foreign‑exchange, compliance and tracing problems. Similar dealer‑led, high‑promised retail schemes in the Guangdong bullion ecosystem have previously morphed into liquidity games; here the interplay of leveraged retail positions and a rapid silver rally heightened the fragility.
The immediate policy implication is clear: regulators face a spike in retail‑market risks created by lightly supervised online precious‑metal trading. Luohu district officials have said they are investigating and supervising assets, but the legal process — criminal investigation, civil claims and asset realisation — is likely to be slow. For Ordinary investors who were drawn to the platform by low deposits and high advertised returns, the losses look likely to be severe and protracted. For Beijing and market supervisors, the episode underscores the need for clearer rules on client fund segregation, limits on leverage in consumer products, and tighter supervision of financialised sales conducted via commercial mini‑programs.