Twenty days after formally retiring as Vanke’s executive vice‑president, Yu Liang has been the subject of unsettling rumours inside the company: colleagues say his habitual social‑media activity ceased the day after his retirement and he has not been publicly visible since. The silence has sharpened memories of last autumn, when other senior Vanke figures were taken from meetings for questioning and one former president faced criminal measures, prompting a wave of leadership changes and shadowed boardrooms.
Yu’s departure closes a 36‑year career that began in Shenzhen’s trading desks and ran through the highest echelons of China’s largest residential developer. He succeeded Wang Shi after the bruising 2017 “Baowan” succession contest and promoted the firm’s shift from founder‑led management to a career‑manager model upgraded into a “business partner” system. That institutional innovation made Vanke a governance case study: it blended long‑term incentives with professional management and helped stabilise the company through China’s boom years.
The incentive system that once looked like a governance fix has also created headaches. Vanke’s employee investment plans, intended to align managers with long‑term performance, produced complex off‑balance‑sheet structures when the property market cooled. Platforms such as Peng Jin Suo and BoShang, plus legacy arrangements inside a financial advisory arm, accumulated funding and redemption pressures that linger as contingent liabilities.
Those legacy problems intensified as the market turned. In early 2025 Shenzhen’s state asset manager completed a full takeover of Vanke and there followed a period of rapid executive churn: board chairs and presidents rotated as regulators scrutinised the company’s external financing ecosystem. In October 2025 a former president was placed under criminal constraints, and other senior figures were briefly detained during meetings; one of those episodes coincided with a short spell when Yu was said to be assisting investigators before returning to the company.
The balance sheet underlines why the company matters beyond boardroom drama. By the end of the third quarter of 2025 Vanke reported interest‑bearing debt of 3629.3 billion yuan and cash holdings of 656.8 billion yuan, leaving heavy rollover risk. The company’s largest shareholder, the Shenzhen Metro‑related group, has extended loans totalling 338.2 billion yuan, but the business still required a successful extension of key medium‑term notes to avoid an immediate liquidity shock.
Last week Vanke cleared an important hurdle when extensions for two troubled MTNs, labelled 22 Vanke MTN004 and MTN005, were approved after multiple setbacks. That temporary reprieve lessened the near‑term risk of a “bond bankruptcy” event, but it does not erase structural questions about off‑balance financing, promised redemptions under employee schemes, or the opaque links between affiliated financing platforms and the listed entity.
If the internal rumours about Yu’s absence reflect an inquiry by authorities, the stakes are high for both his personal reputation and Vanke’s broader clean‑up. A formal probe could force more forensic accounting, accelerate asset sales or restructurings, and pull further threads on financing arrangements that regulators want clarified. Conversely, should Yu reappear without formal charges, his exit could be managed as a quiet, negotiated transfer of responsibility — a different ending for a figure who helped reshape China’s most visible developer.
For international investors and observers the episode is a reminder that China’s property sector remains a litmus test of how the state manages systemic risk in large private enterprises. Vanke’s ability to navigate debt rollovers, resolve off‑balance exposures and complete governance reforms will set a path for other developers that cannot rely solely on shareholder bailouts or ad hoc support from state‑related institutions.