China is turning its commercial space ambitions beyond launch vehicles and satellite services toward the next frontier: small bodies — asteroids, comets and other minor solar system objects. Beijing and a growing group of private firms are prioritising resource prospecting and technologies that could underpin a cislunar economy, while also betting that new downstream markets such as space tourism, in‑orbit services and space‑enabled industries will emerge around those capabilities.
The shift reflects a maturing industrial ecosystem. Where China’s space sector used to be dominated by state research institutes and large state-owned enterprises, an expanding set of private companies now supplies rockets, payloads and mission systems. Those firms are increasingly targeting deep‑space navigation, sample‑return platforms, in‑situ resource utilisation (ISRU) technologies and autonomous prospecting instruments — all essential for surveying and eventually exploiting small bodies.
Commercial actors see several revenue pathways. Water and volatiles from asteroids could be processed into propellant and life‑support consumables, enabling cheaper spacecraft refuelling and longer human presence in cislunar space. Metallic and rare materials, while technically and economically challenging to return to Earth, could support in‑space manufacturing. Meanwhile, capabilities developed for prospecting — precision navigation, long‑duration habitats, and life‑support — also lower the cost threshold for space tourism, orbital hotels and industrial “space+” combinations with earthbound sectors such as telecoms, mining and logistics.
The policy backdrop is deliberate. Chinese authorities have emphasised civil‑military integration and commercialisation in recent industrial plans, and space has been singled out as a strategic area for innovation-led growth. That creates a hybrid model in which private initiative is encouraged but large infrastructure and regulatory frameworks remain under state direction. For firms, this reduces some market risk but channels activity into priorities consistent with national strategic objectives.
Internationally, the direction matters because it alters the supply and demand dynamics of space capabilities. A commercially viable capability to prospect or extract resources from small bodies would accelerate a global market for orbital refuelling, reduce the marginal cost of deep‑space missions for many actors, and complicate existing legal and diplomatic frameworks tied to space resources. The development also presents both cooperation opportunities — joint science missions and standards for resource utilisation — and potential friction over norms, licensing and strategic advantage.
Challenges are substantial. Technological hurdles in anchoring, excavating and processing materials in microgravity remain unresolved at scale. Economic viability depends on breakthroughs in lowering mission costs, establishing reliable ISRU demonstrations and creating robust downstream markets. Legal and regulatory uncertainty under the Outer Space Treaty and national licensing regimes adds project risk, while export controls and geopolitics may limit international supply chains and partnerships.
For investors and policymakers, the short term will be about demonstration: successful prospecting missions, sample returns and small‑scale ISRU pilots that prove technological and economic feasibility. If those proofs arrive, they will catalyse a wave of commercial “space+” scenarios — combining tourism, manufacturing, data services and resource logistics — and reposition China as a central actor in a nascent cislunar economy.