China’s coast guard has disclosed a dramatic rise in maritime law‑enforcement activity since the 2021 enactment of the Coast Guard Law, reporting 550,000 vessel sorties and 6,000 aircraft missions over five years. In a televised interview marking the law’s fifth anniversary, China Coast Guard director Zhang Jianming said the service carried out 134 territorial‑sea patrols of the Diaoyu Islands and logged 357 days of patrols in that area in 2025 alone — effectively a near‑continuous presence around the disputed islands.
The agency framed the increase as routine law enforcement: regular patrols in the East and South China Seas and the Yellow Sea, maritime law enforcement around Taiwan and its affiliated islands, and control operations around Huangyan Island (Scarborough Shoal). Beijing says these deployments implement the central government’s decisions, deter “Taiwan independence” forces and counter “infringing provocations” by other states while building a “new pattern” of law‑based control of the Taiwan Strait.
The figures underscore a deliberate shift in China’s approach to maritime disputes. The 2021 Coast Guard Law expanded the coast guard’s mandate and gave it clearer legal backing to perform a range of coercive activities short of conventional naval warfare, a tool Beijing has increasingly used to pursue sovereignty claims without direct military confrontation. That strategy — often called “grey‑zone” tactics — relies on sustained, ambiguous enforcement by coast guard vessels and civilian maritime assets to normalize Chinese presence in disputed waters.
For neighbouring claimants and outside powers, the near‑daily patrols around the Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku in Japanese) are especially sensitive. The islands are administered by Japan and are covered by U.S. treaty commitments, meaning frequent Chinese coast guard activity raises the risk of maritime incidents, diplomatic protests and a harder security posture from Tokyo and Washington. In the South China Sea and around Scarborough Shoal, similar patterns complicate Southeast Asian claimants’ ability to resist Chinese coercion and increase pressure on regional dispute‑management mechanisms.
The raw numbers are striking but need context. Five years of 550,000 vessel sorties averages roughly 110,000 movements a year — a sustained operational tempo implying substantial investment in patrol assets, logistics and command-and-control. The 6,000 air sorties reported over the same period suggest persistent air surveillance to support maritime operations. Together these data points indicate not only quantitative expansion but also doctrinal change toward integrated sea‑air enforcement operations.
China’s presentation of these activities as lawful and routine is purposeful: it normalizes heightened enforcement and reframes contested spaces as areas of lawful administration. For foreign governments, the challenge is how to respond in ways that deter unsafe encounters without escalating to military confrontation. Options include enhanced maritime domain awareness, calibrated diplomatic protests, joint patrols or exercises with allies, and legal efforts to contest China’s maritime claims.
The coast guard’s claims also have a domestic political dimension. Publicizing long, continuous patrols serves to consolidate nationalistic support at home by demonstrating the state’s resolve to defend territorial claims. Internationally, it signals that Beijing intends to make its maritime claims operational facts on the water — not merely assertions on maps.
As China continues to professionalize and expand its coast guard and supporting air assets, regional states and external powers face a prolonged, messy form of contestation that blends law enforcement, maritime control and political messaging. Managing that contest will be one of the central security challenges in East Asia over the coming decade.