Chinese electronics group Wingtech (闻泰科技) has warned investors that it expects a crippling net loss for 2025 after losing effective control of its European semiconductor unit. In a regulatory filing the company said it now expects net profit attributable to shareholders for the year to be negative RMB 90–135 billion (roughly $1.3–$1.9 billion), citing regulatory measures and a court ruling in the Netherlands that have left its control of Anshi Semiconductor (安世半导体, known internationally as Nexperia) constrained.
The company said that during the fourth quarter of 2025 its subsidiaries Anshi Semiconductor Co., Ltd. and Anshi Semiconductor Holdings received a ministerial Order from the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy as well as an adverse decision from the Enterprise Chamber of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal. Although the ministerial Order has been temporarily suspended, the Enterprise Chamber’s ruling remains in effect, and Wingtech’s control over Anshi is still restricted. Wingtech said it expects to recognise substantial investment losses and asset impairment charges as a result, which will materially depress its full‑year results.
A short note attached to the report highlighted the scale of the fourth‑quarter hit implied by the guidance: Wingtech’s Q3 net profit was reported as RMB 10.4 billion, which implies a Q4 loss on the order of roughly RMB 105–150 billion if the company’s full‑year guidance is reached. The firm did not quantify the precise components of the expected write‑downs in the announcement, but the message is clear: the accounting impact of the Netherlands actions will be heavy.
This episode underscores the geopolitical and regulatory hazards facing cross‑border M&A in strategically sensitive sectors. Anshi/Nexperia, a major maker of discrete and logic chips, has been at the centre of scrutiny in Europe because semiconductor capability is increasingly treated as a national‑security matter. Dutch authorities have special powers to intervene in acquisitions and operations they judge to affect security of supply or critical infrastructure, and the Enterprise Chamber has the authority to take corporate governance measures that can curtail the rights of shareholders.
For Wingtech, the immediate consequence is financial: large impairment charges will erode capital and could pressure liquidity, credit ratings and equity valuations. The ripple effects may be broader. Customers and suppliers that rely on Anshi’s manufacturing and product lines face uncertainty over continuity and investment. Investors will reassess the risks of Chinese firms owning overseas semiconductor assets, and bankers and acquirers will factor tougher regulatory odds into future deals.
Looking ahead, the practical paths available to Wingtech are limited and politically awkward. The company can continue legal appeals, seek negotiated remedies with Dutch authorities, pursue asset restructurings or prepare for forced divestment of parts of Anshi. Any outcome will take months, if not years, and will probably leave a legacy of higher transaction risk premiums for cross‑border semiconductor deals involving Chinese acquirers.
The case is a reminder that corporate strategy in the technology sector is now inseparable from geopolitics. For firms and investors operating at the intersection of China and Europe, the balance sheet consequence is immediate; the strategic consequence is longer‑term: a re‑pricing of the cost and feasibility of controlling overseas semiconductor capabilities.