Israeli and US forces are reported to be engaged in close operational coordination over potential military action against Iran, raising the prospect that Washington could decide within days whether to launch strikes. A senior US official indicated that once forces and logistics are in place, President Trump may make a decision imminently. Israel, meanwhile, is preparing for a difficult calculus: even limited US strikes could prompt significant Iranian retaliation against Israeli targets, which Israel says it would answer forcefully.
Israeli assessments conveyed to local media suggest that potential US strikes would most likely target Iranian nuclear sites and missile-related infrastructure rather than attempt regime change. That emphasis reflects a US and Israeli preference to degrade specific capabilities while avoiding an open-ended campaign, but it also acknowledges the limitations of limited strikes: damage to facilities can still provoke disproportionate responses from Tehran or its regional proxies.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu convened a classified security meeting in Jerusalem on January 29 to evaluate the Iran situation and the possibility of US action. The meeting underscores how seriously Israel is taking the risk that American strikes could draw the country into a wider confrontation or force it to act independently if Iranian retaliation is directed at Israeli territory.
The military and political dynamics at play are familiar but perilous. Targeting Iran’s nuclear and missile infrastructure aims to set back capabilities, yet Iran’s network of proxies—most prominently Hezbollah in Lebanon and various Iraqi and Syrian militias—provides Tehran with avenues for asymmetric retaliation that can rapidly widen a local exchange into a regional confrontation. Israel’s warning that it would respond strongly to any major Iranian attack reflects both deterrence intent and a readiness to escalate.
For Washington, the decision is fraught. A calibrated strike could be portrayed domestically and internationally as a limited enforcement of red lines, but it risks entangling US forces in direct conflict with Iran, complicating relationships with Gulf partners and NATO members asked to support logistics or basing. It also exposes US assets and personnel in the region to counterattacks, and raises the prospect of disruption to global energy markets and shipping routes if Iran or its proxies strike at maritime traffic.
Diplomacy has limited runway in this environment. The disclosed coordination signals alignment between Israel and the US on shared strategic objectives, yet it also highlights a mutual vulnerability: both capitals are operating with imperfect intelligence about how Tehran would respond and about the threshold that would trigger further escalation. The coming days will be a test of whether kinetic pressure can be used to deter without provoking an uncontrollable spiral.
If Washington elects to strike, attention will shift to indicators such as carrier strike group movements, redeployments of US air assets, air-defense postures in Israel and Gulf states, and public Israeli civil-defense steps. Equally important will be Tehran’s messaging and the actions of Iranian-backed groups across the region. The situation remains fluid; a narrowly tailored military action could achieve tactical objectives but would not remove the strategic drivers of confrontation between Iran, Israel and their patrons.