The U.S. Navy’s newest Ford‑class carrier, John F. Kennedy (CVN‑79), began its long‑anticipated first sea trials on 28 January 2026, capping a 15‑year build that started in 2011. What should have been a steady step toward renewed naval capability instead underscores the program’s fits and starts: construction setbacks, repeated delivery slips and a timetable that now stretches to a likely 2027 handover.
The Ford line was meant to be a leap forward: more automation, redesigned flight‑deck operations and, crucially, an electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS) that promised higher sortie generation and better compatibility with modern jets. In practice, EMALS has proved stubbornly unreliable, complicating integration with carrier aircraft and suppressing sortie rates. Those technical shortfalls have dogged the class since the lead ship, USS Ford, and they risk leaving the Kennedy underperforming for years while technicians iterate fixes and pilots adapt.
By contrast, China’s carrier program has been expanding rapidly. From the refit of Liaoning to the commissioning of Shandong and the introduction of Fujian (a large, modern, CATOBAR‑capable hull), Beijing has rapidly moved from experimentation to operational consolidation. Chinese sources now report that construction of a Type 004 nuclear‑powered carrier began in 2026, a milestone that would extend the PLAN’s reach and endurance if the ship’s propulsion, air wing and logistics are successfully integrated.
Behind these divergent trajectories lie deeper industrial and programmatic differences. The U.S. programme has struggled with rising costs, supply‑chain fragility, a shrinking skilled shipbuilding workforce and the complexity of integrating multiple unproven systems into a single hull. Chinese shipyards, by contrast, benefit from standardised modular production, substantial state coordination and heavy investment in digital design tools—factors Beijing credits for rapid throughput and lower per‑ton construction costs, a claim that should be treated cautiously but nevertheless signals an expanding capacity.
The operational implications are more than industrial. Aircraft carriers are floating systems of systems: hull, powerplant, catapults, arresting gear, radar, air wing and logistics must all function together. A delivered carrier still needs months if not years of iterative trials, training and technical upgrades before it can perform sustained combat operations. For the U.S., the Kennedy’s sea trials are a necessary but insufficient step; for China, a nuclear carrier would change deployment options but would also demand matching advances in carrier aviation, anti‑submarine warfare and forward logistics.
The Kennedy’s debut should therefore be read as both progress and a cautionary tale. It marks the continuation of an expensive, technically ambitious American approach that has produced important innovations but also schedule and reliability headaches. Meanwhile, China’s steady production and reported move to nuclear propulsion heighten the strategic stakes in the Indo‑Pacific: the contest now involves not only ship numbers but the ability to integrate systems, train air wings and sustain distant operations under contested conditions.