Xi Jinping has set out an explicit blueprint for turning China into a “financial power,” framing the task as a distinctively Chinese project that combines market mechanisms with firm Party leadership. Published in the Chinese Communist Party’s theory journal Qiushi, the essay lays out eight organising principles for financial work and a checklist of institutions, instruments and cultural norms that Beijing must build to reach world‑leading status.
The piece emphasises continuity with past domestic reforms while stressing political direction: the centralised, unified leadership of the Party is listed first among the principles that should guide China’s financial development. That ordering signals that liberalisation will be pursued only within bounds defined by political control and risk containment.
Xi’s eight principles also include a “people‑centred” value orientation, service to the real economy as finance’s core purpose, a permanent focus on risk prevention, and the simultaneous pursuit of marketisation and the rule of law. Supply‑side structural reform of financial supply, a calibrated balance between opening and security, and the macro policy stance of ‘seeking progress while maintaining stability’ complete the list.
Beyond principles, the article specifies what a financial power looks like: a currency with wide international use and reserve status; a strong central bank capable of effective monetary and macro‑prudential management; globally competitive, high‑efficiency banks and financial institutions; a vibrant international financial centre; robust financial regulation and legal frameworks; and a deep pool of professional talent.
To underpin these ambitions, Xi calls for building a modern Chinese financial system composed of a sound regulatory framework, diversified markets and products, collaborative institutional roles, secure infrastructure and autonomous, controllable systems. He also urges a fusion of law and moral cultivation in finance, promoting cultural traits such as honesty, prudence and “profit in righteousness” as complements to formal rules.
For international observers, the article is both a programme and a signal. It reiterates Beijing’s long‑standing aim to internationalise the renminbi, deepen domestic markets and push Chinese financial firms onto the global stage. At the same time, the insistence on centralised political leadership and “autonomous, controllable” infrastructure underscores continuing limits on capital account liberalisation and the independence of monetary institutions that global markets typically regard as preconditions for full reserve‑currency status.
Practically, this statement will shape Chinese regulatory priorities: expect renewed emphasis on system‑wide risk monitoring, tougher enforcement, capacity building at the People’s Bank of China and other regulators, and selective opening that preserves state control. For foreign banks and investors it signals both opportunity and constraint — access may increase where China needs expertise and capital, but regulatory and political oversight will remain prominent.
Ultimately, the essay frames financial modernisation as a multi‑decade strategic mission tied to national power. Achieving global reserve‑currency status, worldwide institutional reach and decisive voice in international rulemaking will require not only deeper markets and legal reforms, but also the resolution of tensions between political control and the market freedoms that underpin international finance.