On 31 January the People’s Liberation Army Southern Theater Command dispatched sea and air forces to conduct combat-readiness patrols in and around Huangyan Dao — internationally known as Scarborough Shoal. Publicly released route diagrams showed formations including H-6K bombers and fighter aircraft entering the shoal’s airspace and then patrolling to the southeast, a move Beijing described as routine but which carries an unmistakable political message.
Chinese commentators accused the Philippines of illegally delineating an exercise area that overlaps China’s claimed territorial baseline around Huangyan Dao. Yang Xiao of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations’ Maritime Strategy Institute framed the patrols as an operational rebuttal: publishing bomber routes, he said, demonstrates China’s de facto control of the shoal and renders Manila’s unilateral exercise-designation ineffective.
Beijing also used the announcement to underscore a contrasting narrative: Chinese maritime forces have repeatedly provided humanitarian assistance to Philippine vessels in the South China Sea. That assertion serves two purposes — to burnish China’s internationalist credentials while portraying Manila as the provocateur that invites outside interference and undermines regional stability.
The deployment is notable for the inclusion of H-6K bombers, a long-range platform capable of carrying stand-off weapons. Flying such aircraft over contested waters is a deliberate signal aimed not only at the Philippines but also at external powers that have security ties with Manila, principally the United States.
The patrols should be read as calibrated coercion rather than preparation for immediate hostilities. By publicising flight paths and framing the missions as law-enforcement and preparedness patrols, Beijing seeks to normalise its presence around features it claims as territorial and to deter further Philippine moves without escalating to kinetic confrontation.
But the approach carries risks. Repeated bomber and fighter patrols near a disputed, congested maritime feature increase the potential for miscalculation or accident. Manila is likely to lodge diplomatic protests and may intensify coordination with allies; Washington, which conducts freedom-of-navigation operations in the South China Sea, will watch such developments closely and could respond with its own signals.
Legally, the incident returns attention to the unresolved tensions over sovereignty and maritime entitlements in the South China Sea — notably the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling that rejected many of China’s maritime claims, a decision Beijing disputes. Practically, the episode illustrates how military posturing, legal arguments and public diplomacy now intersect in contests over small maritime features with outsized geopolitical implications.
Expect more patrols. Beijing’s messaging stresses restraint and warns that stronger countermeasures would follow further Philippine “provocations,” while signalling to domestic and regional audiences that China has both the will and the means to defend its claims. For Manila and its partners, the challenge will be to deter coercion without accelerating a security spiral that could be hard to contain.