On 31 January the People’s Liberation Army Southern Theater Command staged combined sea‑air combat‑readiness patrols in and around the waters and airspace China claims around Huangyan Island (known in English as Scarborough Shoal). Published route diagrams accompanying the exercise show H‑6K strategic bombers operating in formation with fighter aircraft, entering the shoal’s airspace and then conducting sustained patrols to the southeast.
Chinese commentators framed the sortie as an exercise of effective administration and a rebuttal to Philippine attempts to demarcate an “exercise area” that Beijing says encroaches on its territorial baseline at Huangyan. A researcher at the China Institutes of International Relations’ maritime strategy institute described Manila’s move as illegal and “paper talk,” arguing that such declarations have no practical effect in the face of Chinese patrols.
Beijing also used the episode to reiterate a familiar dual narrative: that it can and will assert control over disputed waters while portraying itself as a responsible actor that has provided humanitarian assistance to Philippine seafarers. The Southern Theater Command’s public messaging stressed both restraint and deterrence, warning that further provocations by the Philippines would be met with stronger countermeasures.
The patrols matter because Huangyan/Scarborough remains one of the most sensitive flashpoints in the South China Sea. Sovereignty over the feature has been contested for more than a decade; a 2016 arbitration panel rejected much of Beijing’s expansive maritime claims under UNCLOS but did not resolve sovereignty. Manila’s recent moves to conduct exercises and draw in external partners risk a cycle of action and response that raises the chances of miscalculation.
Operationally, the use of H‑6K bombers alongside fighters signals a normalization of long‑range bomber missions within China’s peacetime deterrence playbook. Such flights are designed less to prepare for immediate combat than to communicate capability and intent: they demonstrate Beijing’s ability to project power, monitor activity, and control access in waters it considers core interests. Expect similar patrols to recur as Beijing seeks to codify de facto control while calibrating responses to avoid outright escalation with the Philippines or its security partners.