Greentong Technology, a Shenzhen‑listed maker of low‑speed, on‑site electric vehicles best known for golf carts, has seen its profitability collapse after Washington imposed steep trade measures and launched an anti‑dumping and countervailing ("double‑remedy") probe into Chinese low‑speed vehicles. The company told investors it expects 2025 net profit attributable to shareholders of just RMB 40–50 million, a decline of roughly two‑thirds compared with 2024, and adjusted net profit of only RMB 2–3 million — near wipe‑out territory for an enterprise that a few years ago relied on the US for more than half its sales.
The immediate cause is blunt: US duties and the ongoing investigation have throttled sales into its formerly largest market. Greentong’s US revenue fell from RMB 242 million in 2024 to about RMB 48.7 million in 2025 — a near 80% collapse year‑on‑year — and its US share of group sales went from roughly 53% in 2023 to under 10% in the first nine months of 2025. That sudden revenue shock has been compounded by large, conservative write‑downs. The company booked total impairment and allowance charges of about RMB 76.8 million for 2025, including RMB 52.4 million of receivables provisioning tied to slow customer repayments and RMB 23.6 million of inventory markdowns.
On the face of the income statement, an apparent rescue plan has delivered top‑line relief but not profit. Greentong’s consolidated revenue rose to RMB 998 million in 2025 from RMB 830 million a year earlier after the company completed a controlling, 51% acquisition of Jiangsu Damo Semiconductor in September 2025. Damo, a provider of integrated‑circuit testing, wafer inspection and equipment services, was folded into consolidated accounts and supplied an incremental revenue stream. But the semiconductor contribution has not offset the hit to margins and the one‑off impairment burden; adjusted profitability remains sharply lower and the group faces persistent cash‑flow pressure.
The episode illustrates three familiar but important dynamics. First, trade remedies — anti‑dumping and countervailing investigations and the tariffs they spawn — remain an effective lever to quickly reconfigure export flows and corporate fortunes, especially for small, specialised manufacturers whose sales are concentrated in a single overseas market. Second, acquisitions of high‑profile assets in the semiconductors sector can inflate revenue but are not a short‑term panacea: chip‑related businesses are capital‑intensive, have long product‑development cycles and require different operational competencies from vehicle manufacturing. Third, corporate attempts to de‑risk by moving into higher‑tech fields are expensive and risky, particularly when they use cash raised for the core business.
Greentong says it is pursuing market diversification — boosting sales in Southeast Asia, the Middle East and domestically — and increasing investment to pivot away from the US. Those are sensible steps, but they will take time and further capital, and they do not erase the legacy of large receivables tied to US customers or the reputational and distribution disruption from being a mandatory respondent in a high‑profile US probe. For investors and competitors, the company’s path underscores the broader vulnerability of Chinese exporters with concentrated market exposure and the limits of rapid cross‑sector pivots as a remedy for trade‑driven revenue shocks.
For the wider industry the implications are immediate. Suppliers of low‑speed electric vehicles, many of which built export businesses around the stable US market, must now weigh defensive options: contest duties through litigation and administrative channels, relocate production, pursue deeper market diversification, or build higher‑value products that are less vulnerable to trade remedies. Meanwhile, an influx of non‑traditional buyers for semiconductor assets — firms seeking a ‘chip halo’ — raises the risk of misallocated capital in an already overheated sector that demands technological depth and patient investment.
Greentong’s numbers are a cautionary tale for shareholders and policymakers alike. The company turned to a headline‑friendly semiconductor acquisition to demonstrate a new strategic direction, and it did deliver higher consolidated sales. But the timing, scale and financial health of that bet leave open a stark question: can a small, export‑hit electric‑vehicle maker meaningfully transform itself into a profitable participant in the semiconductor ecosystem before the financial strain from tariffs and impairments does lasting damage? The answer will depend on execution, access to fresh capital, and whether the company can rebuild diversified, resilient revenue streams outside the US.