Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araghchi reiterated on 31 January that Tehran's first preference remains diplomacy, but he set out strict preconditions: negotiations must occur only after threats and pressure have been removed. Araghchi said the current environment is not suitable for serious talks and that without agreement on the framework, content and rules, substantive progress is impossible. He accused the United States of preferring indirect, third‑party contact and insisted Iran will not accept imposed negotiations or talks conducted without mutual respect and equality.
Alongside the diplomatic caveats, Araghchi issued a clear security warning: if Iran is attacked, it will respond "firmly and forcefully." He also defended the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' record, asserting that the IRGC has played an important role in combating ISIS and similar extremist groups. He warned that European postures risk exacerbating tensions rather than calming them.
The remarks arrive against a backdrop of faltering diplomacy over Iran's nuclear programme, strained Iran‑West relations and a region on edge. Western efforts to revive elements of the 2015 nuclear deal have repeatedly stalled over sequencing, verification and sanctions relief, while Washington has alternated between direct negotiation and back‑channel approaches through regional intermediaries. Tehran's demand that coercive pressure be lifted before talks can proceed is a recurring red line that complicates any immediate return to formal negotiations.
Araghchi's statement performs dual political work. Externally, it signals to capitals in Washington, Brussels and regional rivals that Iran remains open to engagement but will not be hurried into talks under duress. Domestically, it reassures hardliners and the security establishment that diplomacy will not come at the expense of deterrence — the government is prepared to answer any attack with force. The invocation of the IRGC's counter‑extremism credentials also bolsters Tehran's claim to regional legitimacy and frames European criticism as misdirected.
For policymakers, the combination of conditional openness and a deterrence warning raises familiar risks: miscalculation and escalation. If external actors interpret the caveats as stall tactics, efforts to increase pressure could provoke reciprocal moves by Iran — from missile tests and naval harassment to proxy attacks in the Levant or Gulf. Conversely, a carefully sequenced diplomatic initiative that addresses Iran's core demand to remove overt coercion could reopen space for substantive compromise, but only if verification and enforcement mechanisms are credible to all sides.
The European dimension merits attention. Araghchi's blunt charge that European positions aggravate tensions highlights a persistent strain: EU capitals seek to balance pressure on Tehran with a desire to avoid direct confrontation, but heavy-handed measures risk pushing Iran further into asymmetric counters. For regional security, the statement underscores that Tehran is trying to keep open both a diplomatic channel and a credible military deterrent — a posture that will test the risk tolerance of both Western and Gulf actors in the months ahead.