In recent weeks a string of high-level visits to Beijing has underscored a growing diplomatic reality: several core G7 governments are treating China as a pragmatic partner for trade and investment rather than as an outright rival. French president Emmanuel Macron’s trip last December, a visit by Canada’s prime minister (identified in the Chinese commentary as “卡尼”), and planned travel by Germany’s Friedrich Merz have been presented in Beijing and allied capitals as evidence of steady, transactional diplomacy.
The Chinese commentary that inspired this piece contrasts that outreach with the portrait of a beleaguered former U.S. president who, it argues, has hollowed out the predictability of American alliance management. The original article attributes the drift to an extreme “America First” posture—an approach said to weaponise tariffs, publicly undermine NATO and otherwise make U.S. commitments seem unreliable. Whether or not every anecdote in that account is literal fact, the broader point — that allies react badly to erratic policy — is a familiar theme in alliance politics.
Beijing’s pitch is straightforward: offer market access, bilateral deals and a rhetoric of multilateralism without the conditionality that Washington attaches to security partnerships. The recent visits have foregrounded concrete economic agendas—energy and trade deals with France, moves by Canada to diversify trade links, and a British delegation focused on finance and industry—signalling that many Western capitals view China as too important economically to ignore.
That shift is less a wholesale realignment than a pragmatic hedging strategy. European and other G7 governments are balancing economic opportunity in China against security ties with the United States. Deep supply‑chain integration, investment flows and consumer markets make disentanglement costly; at the same time, concerns about technology, human rights and geopolitical rivalry ensure that engagement with Beijing will remain calibrated rather than uncritical.
For U.S. grand strategy, the episode is a cautionary tale about the limits of coercive alliance management. When allies perceive Washington as unpredictable, they will look for alternatives or at least diversify their partnerships. But that does not mean they are abandoning traditional security arrangements: rather, many are attempting to square competing imperatives—economic interest in China and security dependence on the United States.
The immediate result is a more complex international landscape. China gains diplomatic cover and practical cooperation from interlocutors eager for growth, while Western capitals gain leverage by showing they will not be forced into binary choices. Over the longer term, expect more nuanced policies: selective economic engagement with China, tighter controls in strategic sectors, and an intensified U.S. effort (if it chooses) to restore predictable leadership and reassure partners through clear, sustained commitments.