Flight-tracking data published on 29 January 2026 show a U.S. MC-130J special-operations transport routing through NATO airspace into Azerbaijan, prompting alarmist claims in Chinese-language social and state-adjacent media that American special forces are positioning to strike or seize leaders in Tehran. The MC-130J, a variant of Lockheed Martin’s C-130J tailored for infiltration, aerial refuelling and low-observable operations, is routinely used by U.S. Special Operations Command for missions that require clandestine insertion and extraction. The presence of such an aircraft in the South Caucasus is notable because it offers the U.S. a logistical axis onto Iran’s comparatively thinly defended northern approaches.
The sensational leap embraced by some commentary — that U.S. forces intend to replicate a fictional “Delta Force-style” snatch of President Raisi or Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei — outstrips verifiable evidence. International outlets, including The Economist, have reported that U.S. officials have periodically examined a range of options against Iran, from strikes on military infrastructure to hostage-rescue-style raids, but planning does not equal intent to execute and such operations carry profound risks. That caveat is important: flight movements alone do not confirm specific targeting orders, yet they do change the tactical and diplomatic calculus in a tense region.
Azerbaijan’s geography and recent behaviour make it a sensitive staging ground. Baku sits on the Caspian approaches to northern Iran and has deepened security ties with Israel and, to a lesser extent, with Western militaries in recent years. Israel conducted strikes in June 2025 that, according to open-source analysts, used air corridors over the Caspian; those operations demonstrated how attacks from the north could bypass Iran’s more heavily defended western and southern approaches. If U.S. aircraft and special-operations assets operate from Azerbaijani soil or airspace, Iran’s northern defences will have to be re-prioritised, complicating Teheran’s ability to deter incursions elsewhere.
Moscow’s role is a parallel thread that increases complexity. Russian Il-76 transport flights to Tehran and the reported delivery of Mi-28 attack helicopters and other defence kit to Iran are intended both to bolster Iranian anti-access capabilities and to signal that Russia remains a security partner. Those deliveries, however, do not instantly redress the erosion of Iran’s integrated air-defence network after sustained strikes and electronic warfare campaigns in 2025. Mi-28s are useful for countering small formations of insertion helicopters and for close air defence, but they are not a panacea against a full-spectrum aerial campaign involving stealth fighters, strike drones and massed aerial refuelling.
Strategically, the political consequences of any move to use Azerbaijani territory would be severe. Baku risks being drawn directly into a confrontation with Tehran, exposing itself to asymmetric retaliation or political blowback among its large Azerbaijani and regional constituencies. For Washington, using a third-party state as a staging ground for kinetic action against Iran would complicate relations with both regional partners and other great powers, especially Russia and China, and would strip any operation of plausible deniability. The reputational and legal ramifications of an attempted “decapitation” strike — attempted assassination or kidnap of senior political figures — would be globally destabilising.
On the operational level the U.S. repertoire for such a mission is well understood: tilt-rotor MV-22 Ospreys, heavy-lift CH-47 Chinooks and MH-60 Black Hawks supported by MC-130s for low-level insertion are the platforms typically discussed in planning circles. Those assets require air superiority or suppression of enemy air defences to operate safely, a condition Iran’s recent air-defence upgrades and Russian deliveries aim to contest. Conversely, Israel’s continued willingness to strike Iranian assets and the prospect of combined U.S.-Israeli operations would raise the probability of broader escalation, especially if covert strikes misfire or if Tehran chooses to retaliate against western facilities or partners in the region.
The most immediate effect of the flight movement and the subsequent media storm is political. Azerbaijani carriers rerouted flights away from Iranian airspace on 29 January, a small but telling sign of anxiety in Baku and the region. Tehran, for its part, will accelerate both defensive preparations — deploying recently acquired helicopters, hardening command-and-control nodes and conducting internal security sweeps to counter potential infiltration — and public messaging that frames any encroachment as justification for robust retaliation. In short, even absent a decided plan to strike, the repositioning of assets has altered threat perceptions and will tend to harden responses on all sides.