In the opening months of 2026, a string of crises and geopolitical shifts has sharpened a debate that has been brewing for decades: who sets the rules of the international system? A feature in China’s People’s Daily draws together voices from Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Pacific to argue that the Global South is no longer a passive recipient of rules made elsewhere, but an active shaper of a new, more plural international order.
The article assembles testimony from four prominent scholars and practitioners — from Hong Kong, Fiji, South Africa and Peru — to sketch a narrative of historical grievance turned into contemporary agency. They link present-day cooperation to the legacy of Bandung and the Non-Aligned Movement, and cite recent diplomatic and institutional advances: climate diplomacy at COP30, South-South trade and infrastructural projects, BRICS enlargement and a string of G20 presidencies held by Southern countries.
Contributors emphasize that a shared memory of colonialism and marginalization underpins the current push. That collective experience, they argue, fosters common priorities: national sovereignty, non-interference, diversified development models and a demand for fairer representation in institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and the United Nations Security Council.
Beyond rhetoric, the piece points to concrete arenas where Southern actors are exerting influence. It highlights China’s Global Development, Security, Civilization and Governance initiatives, agricultural and infrastructure partnerships in Africa, a Brazilian-hosted COP30 that pushed climate finance and just energy transition higher on the agenda, and China’s Global AI Governance Initiative as an example of Southern countries proposing their own rules in emerging technological domains.
The contributors portray the Global South as a mediator, not merely a challenger. They note instances where Southern leaders have tried to defuse conflicts and open dialogue — forming “Friends of Peace” groupings at the UN and sending envoys to conflict zones. Such interventions, the article contends, reflect an alternative insistence on negotiation and development rather than bloc-driven confrontation.
Yet the piece is not blind to geopolitical friction. It frames Southern activism partly as a reaction to perceived Western unilateralism: sanctions, military interventions, and attempts to export normative models. Southern states, the authors say, increasingly refuse to subordinate their interests to great-power agendas and seek more equitable economic and institutional arrangements instead.
Practical collaboration is foregrounded: technology transfers, agricultural demonstration centres in Nigeria, youth exchanges, and infrastructure projects are offered as evidence that South-South ties produce tangible benefits. The narrative stresses that these projects are framed as partnerships rather than “model exports,” and are presented as responsive to national priorities and long-term capacity building.
For international audiences the piece serves as both description and argument: the Global South’s greater cohesion is presented as an historically grounded corrective to an order that many in the South view as tilted toward advanced economies. Whether this cohesion translates into durable institutional change depends on the South’s ability to coordinate divergent interests and on how established powers respond.
That uncertainty is the central geopolitical implication. If Southern states succeed in reshaping voting shares, norms and rule-making venues, global governance could become more multipolar and development-focused. If, however, competition hardens into competing blocs, the result may be institutional fragmentation and transactional diplomacy that leaves global public goods — climate, pandemic preparedness, technological governance — harder to secure.
The People’s Daily framing is itself instructive: the article functions as a narrative of partnership that elevates China’s role as a connector of Southern agendas while emphasizing non-impositional cooperation. For readers outside China, the piece offers a window into how Chinese state media and allied Southern voices are articulating a shared vision of a rebalanced world order.
This discussion matters because the shape of global governance determines who sets standards in trade, climate, finance and technology. The Global South’s push for fairer representation and alternative institutional mechanisms is likely to intensify debates over IMF quotas, World Bank capital, UN Security Council reform, and governance of emerging technologies, with consequences for international investment, standards-setting and diplomatic alignments.