Turkey’s Competition Authority announced on 4 February that it has launched a fresh antitrust investigation into Google’s conduct in the mobile market, focusing on arrangements tied to the Android ecosystem. Regulators say that, despite earlier fines and subsequent policy changes, Google has used financial incentives to steer handset manufacturers into signing so‑called optional agreements that, in practice, secure pre‑installation and default status for Google’s search and browser products.
The probe goes beyond simple bundling allegations. Investigators will also scrutinise contractual clauses that prevent device makers from developing or shipping forked versions of Android, and they will examine Google’s developer verification procedures, which can restrict the distribution of third‑party apps and alternative app stores. The Competition Authority said the aim is to determine whether Google’s new contract structures are a way of evading prior remedies and continuing to impair competition in the Turkish mobile market.
This inquiry lands in the middle of a long‑running global campaign by regulators to curb the market power of major tech platforms. Google has been fined in multiple jurisdictions for Android‑related practices and has modified some of its agreements in response; but enforcement authorities have increasingly turned their attention to subtler mechanisms — payments, incentives and contractual design — that can deliver the same dominant outcomes without explicit bundling.
The mechanics at issue are straightforward but consequential. Pre‑installation and default settings funnel users and vast streams of advertising revenue to the designated services, entrenching incumbents. Financial incentives to original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and carriers can make those outcomes appear voluntary on paper while being highly coercive in practice. Meanwhile, anti‑fork clauses and strict developer verification regimes limit the ability of third parties to create or distribute interoperable alternatives, reducing the space for rivals to emerge.
For Google, Turkey represents both a significant national market and a strategic compliance bellwether. A finding that the company has continued to lock in defaults through new contractual forms could produce remedies ranging from behavioural changes to fines, and it would add weight to similar cases elsewhere. For regulators elsewhere — particularly in Europe, the United States and emerging markets — Turkey’s approach signals a willingness to probe contractual incentives and technical constraints as part of competition enforcement.
The outcome matters for consumers and device makers as well. If regulators succeed in loosening default channels and reducing contractual barriers to forks and alternative app distribution, users could see more browser and search options out of the box and developers might gain easier access to end users. But any move that loosens control over the Android base also revives questions about device security, update coordination and fragmentation — trade‑offs that regulators and industry will need to weigh.
The Turkish Competition Authority has not published a timetable for the investigation. Its findings, however, are likely to inform an increasingly sophisticated global debate about how to police platform power: whether remedies should target technical integration, payment structures, contractual language or some combination of the three. The probe is another reminder that dominant platforms face simultaneous, overlapping scrutiny on multiple fronts and that compliance will increasingly require structural as well as procedural changes.