On February 4, China’s military media released a set of themed posters celebrating Lichun, the traditional start of spring, that frame the opening of the training calendar as a surge in momentum for the armed forces. The short item, posted via state-linked outlets and syndication platforms, emphasized renewed drills and the “springtime drive” behind ongoing efforts to build a stronger military.
The imagery and language are straightforwardly upbeat: soldiers and units are depicted moving from winter into a busy season of exercises, with captions invoking progress along the “strong army” road. The piece is light on operational detail; its primary function is stylistic and motivational rather than informational, offering citizens and service members a symbolic cue that training tempo is rising.
Such seasonal messaging is a familiar tool in Beijing’s communications playbook. The PLA has long synchronized public-relations efforts with cultural markers like solar terms and national anniversaries to frame routine readiness work as part of a broader national renewal. That approach reinforces domestic morale, normalizes sustained preparedness, and ties military modernisation to patriotic sentiment promoted by the Communist Party.
For external observers, the poster campaign is less a signal of new capabilities than a reminder of continuity: the PLA will maintain high training tempo and publicize it as it pursues force-modernization goals. In a regional environment marked by tensions around Taiwan, the South China Sea and Sino-U.S. rivalry, such symbolic acts should be read alongside — not in place of — substantive indicators like published exercise schedules, force deployments and procurement activity.