A recent surge of rhetoric from Japan’s political right — epitomised by comments attributed to senior LDP figure Sanae Takaichi and echoed by Japan’s representative in Taiwan — has framed developments across the Taiwan Strait as a matter of Japan’s very survival. The phrase “existential crisis” (存亡危机), rooted in language from Japan’s Self-Defense Forces law, has been revived at a politically sensitive moment ahead of national elections and rapidly stoked controversy at home and abroad. Critics in Beijing and state-aligned media have responded with sharp denunciations, characterising the language as deliberate provocation and electioneering.
The legal underpinning cited by Tokyo’s hardliners is real: Japan’s security legislation contemplates use of force when the state’s survival is judged to be under clear threat and no other means can remove it. Right-wing politicians have seized on that clause to argue for a more assertive posture in the Taiwan Strait, and to normalise a broader scope for Japan’s security activities. At the same time, calls to explicitly enshrine the Self-Defense Forces in Japan’s constitution signal a sustained campaign to remove postwar legal constraints and to reframe the country’s military role.
Concrete policy moves have accompanied the rhetoric. Tokyo plans a marked increase in defence outlays for fiscal 2026, with public reports citing a target near ¥9 trillion, while deployments of missiles and defensive systems in the south-western island chain are being accelerated. To proponents these steps are prudent hedging against a deteriorating regional environment; to opponents they look like a redefinition of intent — an effort to project power beyond strictly defensive needs and to position Japan as a security provider in the western Pacific.
From Beijing’s perspective, these developments are inseparable from sovereignty politics. The article under review presents Taiwan explicitly as a domestic Chinese matter and casts Japanese interventionist talk as a direct challenge to China’s territorial integrity. It warns that any foreign interference would draw strong Chinese reprisal, and stresses the risk of catastrophic collateral harm if Tokyo and Beijing miscalculate. That alarmist framing is intended both to delegitimise Japanese policy choices and to rally domestic audiences against external meddling.
There is also a clear domestic political calculus at work. Using an external “crisis” to mobilise support is a familiar tactic in democracies; in Japan it appears aimed at consolidating conservative voters, justifying defence spending increases and neutralising internal critics of constitutional revision. The immediate payoffs for politicians can be significant, but they carry the long-term costs of militarising public discourse, narrowing policy options, and increasing the risk of policy lock-in even if electoral winds shift later.
For international audiences the trajectory matters because small shifts in language and posture can produce large changes in deterrence dynamics. If Tokyo continues to blur the line between deterrence and direct involvement in the Taiwan Strait, Washington will face harder choices about expectations of Japanese support and the allocation of alliance burdens. Regional states and commercial actors will watch for escalation pathways, and the economic fallout of heightened tensions would be felt across supply chains. De‑escalatory diplomacy and clearer communication about red lines would reduce the risk of miscalculation; absent that, rhetoric and rearmament could make catastrophe more likely than policymakers currently acknowledge.