With just four days until the election, Japan appears poised for a decisive rightward shift. Polling has elevated Sanae Takaichi from fringe contender to front‑runner, and commentators and voters alike are bracing for a campaign that could alter Japan’s postwar political architecture.
An Asahi Shimbun poll showing 63.3% support for Takaichi underlines how central security has become to voters’ minds. Her platform centres on a single, transformative promise: to enshrine the Self‑Defense Forces (SDF) in Article 9 of the constitution and label them a legitimate “capable military organisation.” That pledge is packaged as “normalising” Japan, but it carries the unmistakable potential to change Tokyo’s role in East Asian security.
Article 9 — the postwar clause renouncing war and the maintenance of armed forces — has long been the constitutional anchor of Japan’s pacifism. Since the 1950s successive governments have navigated around it, developing the SDF under careful legal and rhetorical constraints. A formal constitutional amendment, however, would be a symbolic and legal break with that restraint, requiring a two‑thirds majority in both Diet chambers and a national referendum.
Takaichi’s apparent surge matters because the arithmetic may be within reach. Media coverage has suggested a coalition between the Liberal Democratic Party and the Japan Innovation Party could secure more than 300 seats — a working supermajority — enabling fast‑track moves on constitutional review and committee leadership. Her public pledge to wrest control of the Diet’s constitution review mechanism signals an intent to use parliamentary levers to accelerate change.
Domestically, the proposal is polarising. Supporters who worry about China, North Korea and a perceived decline in deterrence see constitutional revision as overdue realism. Opponents warn of historical amnesia, pointing to the unpalatable symbolism of reviving a permanent military role after the traumas of the 20th century. The result would likely be deeper social fissures and a renewed debate over national identity.
Regionally, Beijing and Moscow are watching closely. The campaign has already been invoked by officials in Beijing and, in meetings described in Japanese media, by Russian counterparts as a reason for heightened vigilance and even talk of countermeasures. Any formal shift toward a constitutionally authorised military will not only complicate Tokyo’s diplomatic ties but also recalibrate calculations in Seoul, Taipei and Washington.
That said, legalising the SDF is neither an immediate nor an unchecked gateway to a large‑scale remilitarisation. Practical constraints — budgetary limits, alliance politics with the United States, parliamentary procedures, and the need to win a national referendum — act as brakes. Moreover, Tokyo would face regional counter‑responses and the risk that attempts to expand capability could entangle Japan in greater insecurity rather than enhance it.
Whatever the election’s result, the contest has already forced a national reckoning about Japan’s postwar settlement and its future role in regional security. If Takaichi obtains the power she seeks, the coming years will test whether Japan can reconcile a stronger security posture with the constitutional and historical restraints that have shaped its diplomacy for eight decades.