A provocative commentary circulating in Chinese media argues that Beijing’s overseas investments — notably in Venezuela, Panama and Cambodia — are increasingly exposed to seizure or erosion as geopolitical pressure and local political shifts bite. The piece frames recent events in stark terms: an alleged US operation against Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro on January 3 and a Panama court ruling said to follow US wishes, both presented as examples of how legal and extralegal measures can strip China of long-standing economic stakes.
The article singles out port and infrastructure projects as particularly vulnerable. It says Chinese capital tied up in Panama’s port facilities and in Venezuelan investments built up over two decades could be “eaten up” if host states or third parties act under outside pressure. The commentary does not stop at alarm: it explicitly advocates “带刀护卫” — literally “armed protection” — including military options to secure Chinese assets abroad.
Beijing’s recent involvement in Cambodia is used as an illustration of unintended strategic outcomes. The piece notes about $300m of Chinese-funded upgrades to Cambodia’s Ream naval base and describes how Japanese and then US navy vessels visited the upgraded facility in April 2025 and January 2026 respectively, framing those port calls as evidence the projects can be co-opted by rival powers for their own security diplomacy.
The commentary also warns that Chinese-backed projects such as the proposed canal scheme in Cambodia face acute political risk as Phnom Penh’s leadership appears to tilt toward the West. It highlights the Western education and perceived pro-US leanings of Prime Minister Hun Manet and his family as a potential source of future friction that could imperil Chinese equity and control in joint ventures.
Taken together, the article paints a world returning to “law of the jungle” geopolitics, where large overseas investments without a military backstop are unsafe. Its prescription is blunt: a mix of hard measures, including military capability, tailored to different countries — in short, escort large projects with force where necessary — to prevent them from becoming “lambs on the menu” of other powers.
For international readers the piece matters for three reasons. First, it signals a vocally hawkish strand of Chinese domestic commentary that views economic statecraft as inseparable from security. Second, it highlights real vulnerabilities investors face when host-country courts, regime changes or third-party pressures alter the legal and political environment. Third, the recommended response — normalising military protection for economic projects — would represent a significant departure from the predominant tools of Chinese overseas engagement to date, and would have wide geopolitical consequences.
There are practical alternatives and costs worth weighing. Military protection of foreign assets would risk direct confrontation, legitimize reciprocal measures by rivals, and damage China’s long-term commercial credibility and soft power. Less escalatory but effective measures include stronger legal clauses, diversified ownership structures, political-risk insurance, multilateral dispute mechanisms and diplomatic bargaining backed by economic leverage. State-backed insurance and contingency funds, local partnerships that embed interests in host-country politics, and careful project selection could mitigate many risks without crossing the threshold into force projection.
The article, however, reflects a broader reassessment inside China of how to protect overseas interests in an era of rising US–China competition and selective US pressure on third countries. Whether policymakers adopt the article’s hawkish prescription is another matter; endorsing military escorts for civilian investments would reshape regional security dynamics and likely invite countermeasures that could endanger the very assets the policy intends to protect.
In short, the debate the commentary stokes is real: how to reconcile China's global economic footprint with a more contested international order. The answer will determine not just the security of Chinese capital abroad but also the character of Beijing’s global engagement — whether it doubles down on economic statecraft and legal tools or turns toward a riskier, militarised approach.