The United States and Iran have agreed to hold direct talks in Oman on February 6, a fragile step toward defusing a confrontation that has oscillated between diplomacy and military brinkmanship. The decision to relocate the talks from Turkey to Oman followed Iranian demands that the negotiations be bilateral and limited to the nuclear file, positions Washington has resisted in public statements.
Tensions escalated hours before the scheduled talks when U.S. forces shot down an Iranian Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) near the USS Abraham Lincoln in the Arabian Sea and escorted an American-flagged tanker away from approaching Iranian Revolutionary Guard vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran described its UAV as conducting routine reconnaissance on the high seas and said a separate trawler had been warned after allegedly entering Iranian territorial waters; U.S. officials framed the actions as provocative and risky.
The U.S. delegation will include President Trump’s Middle East envoy and his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, while Iran will be led by veteran negotiator Abbas Araghchi. Washington has signalled it seeks to extend discussions beyond nuclear restrictions to include curbs on Iran’s ballistic missile programme and an end to support for regional militant groups that oppose Israel, demands Iran rejects as outside the scope of acceptable negotiations.
The naval incidents underscore the thin margin for error. In June 2025, the United States launched a campaign dubbed “Midnight Hammer” that struck Iranian nuclear sites at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan — a move that both sides cite when arguing for deterrence and leverage. Israeli leaders, who met U.S. envoys in Jerusalem ahead of the talks, have pushed Washington to preserve freedom of action and to distrust Iranian commitments.
Washington’s negotiating posture is therefore bifurcated: it must balance the tactical objective of securing concessions from Tehran with the strategic imperative of reassuring regional allies and deterring further Iranian coercion. Tehran, for its part, is signalling caution: publicly neither optimistic nor pessimistic, it insists on preserving defensive capabilities and preparing for a range of outcomes should diplomacy falter.
The tug-of-war over venue, participants and agenda is more than procedural. Iran’s insistence on bilateral, narrowly focused talks reduces the number of interlocutors that could pressure Tehran to make concessions on missiles or proxy activity, while U.S. attempts to broaden the agenda reflect Washington’s desire to tie the nuclear file to long-standing regional security concerns.
Should the talks proceed in Oman, the immediate question is whether the parties can compartmentalize and reach modest, verifiable agreements that reduce the risk of further military clashes. If they cannot, the pattern of episodic maritime confrontations and reciprocal strikes could accelerate, heightening the risk of miscalculation and wider regional escalation.
For international observers and regional capitals alike, the meeting in Oman will be a test of whether diplomacy can outpace deterrence. The outcome may shape not only the future of Iran’s nuclear programme but also the stability of maritime trade routes and the posture of U.S. forces in the Gulf for months to come.
