Multiple Middle Eastern governments privately pressured the Trump administration on February 4 to withdraw an ultimatum to cancel scheduled talks with Iran, prompting Washington to restore a meeting originally set for February 6 and relocate it to Oman. Chinese state media reported that U.S. officials had earlier rejected Iran’s proposal to move the venue from Istanbul to Muscat, but capitulated after intense regional lobbying.
The episode reflected alarm across the region that a U.S. withdrawal from talks could be followed by military measures. At least nine countries contacted the White House at the highest levels to urge that the meeting proceed, according to the Chinese report. One U.S. official quoted by the outlet said Arab governments "asked us to continue the meeting, to hear what Iran had to say," and that Washington had told them it would hold the session if they insisted, though American officials remained "very skeptical."
Another American source framed the restored meeting as a gesture to regional partners and a way to preserve a diplomatic option: the Trump administration agreed to proceed "out of respect" for allies and to continue seeking a non‑military path. The choice of Oman as host is meaningful: Muscat has long played a discreet intermediary role between Iran and Western powers, offering neutral ground when direct contact is politically sensitive.
The immediate significance is less about breakthrough diplomacy than about crisis management. The regional lobbying campaign underscores how deeply Gulf capitals fear escalation, and how much influence they retain in constraining U.S. policy choices when stability is at stake. For Washington, acceding to allied pressure preserves short‑term calm, but it does not resolve core disagreements with Tehran — and American officials’ skepticism signals that the resumed talks could be perfunctory or fragile.
If the meeting goes ahead, its value will depend on whether it is treated as a preliminary confidence‑building exchange or as the start of substantive negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme and wider regional behaviour. A cancellation would have heightened the risk of military contingency plans gaining traction; a low‑yield, symbolic session would buy time and reassure nervous neighbours while leaving the underlying strategic contest intact.
The broader takeaway is that Middle Eastern actors still exercise significant leverage over U.S. decision‑making on regional security matters, and that diplomatic choreography — venue changes, backchannel pressure, and multilateral urging — can be decisive in moments of high tension. How both sides use the Oman meeting will determine whether it is a brief detour from confrontation or the first step toward a more durable de‑escalation.
