China’s long-running housing delivery crisis — the “sold-but-undelivered” projects that rattled buyers and markets — has largely been contained, Beijing says. By the end of the 14th Five‑Year Plan cycle authorities report about 7.5 million previously stalled units have been completed and handed over to purchasers, and a national campaign to finish construction and stabilise the sector is entering its final phase.
The resolution followed a three‑year, centrally coordinated effort that mobilised work teams at national, provincial and municipal levels, tightened responsibilities for local governments, developers and banks, and used a mix of financing support and judicial remedies. Ministry data published in November 2025 showed that roughly 3.96 million units targeted under a specific “delivery assurance” drive had achieved a 99 percent completion rate, while loan approvals for projects on a government “white list” have exceeded 7 trillion yuan, providing dedicated funding to allow work to finish.
Major developers have reported large-scale deliveries. Country Garden disclosed about 1.85 million units handed over between 2022 and 2025. Sunac, Greenland, China Fortune Land and others similarly reported cumulative deliveries in the tens or hundreds of thousands of homes. The broad flows of completed units have materially reduced the immediate risk of mass defaults by buyers and the reputational shock that left many purchasers fearful of unfinished homes.
With the immediate “delivery risk” contained, policymakers are pivoting from crisis management to structural reform. Central guidance stresses an exit from the high‑leverage, high‑turnover development model that fuelled the earlier boom. New institutional measures include enforcing a project‑company model with ring‑fenced construction funds, a lead‑bank arrangement to centralise project finance oversight, and a gradual move to promote sales of completed homes so buyers get “what they see is what they get.”
The shift has already changed developers’ behaviour. Many firms have prioritised debt restructuring, asset disposals and converting unsold stock into smoother revenue streams rather than aggressive land acquisition. Several large private groups say they will be cautious about new land purchases and expect 2026 to be a year of consolidation rather than expansion. Local governments, meanwhile, are being encouraged to reuse existing commercial stock for social housing, staff accommodation and talent housing to relieve inventory pressure.
Market signals are mixed. Deliveries and policy support have removed the immediate systemic threat and helped restore buyer confidence in many cities; prices appear to be stabilising in a number of first‑tier and otherwise resilient markets. But nationwide sales have not uniformly recovered, credit stress remains in parts of the banking sector and the performance of smaller developers continues to diverge sharply from state‑backed or well‑capitalised firms.
The political economy is shifting. The central economic work meeting set the 2026 agenda: hold the line on financial and social stability, clear remaining risks, and guide the market toward higher quality supply and institutional governance. The new emphasis on selling completed units and stricter financing structures is meant to reduce future systemic risk, but it also implies lower cyclical stimulus from property investment and a longer, more structural adjustment for an industry that has for decades been a growth engine for China’s economy.