Iran and the United States held indirect talks in Muscat on February 6, a short diplomatic encounter that Tehran described as a constructive opening. Iran's foreign minister, rendered in Chinese as 阿拉格齐 (Alaghezi), said the talks concluded for now but that both sides agreed to continue them. He emphasized that avoiding threats and coercion was a necessary precondition for any dialogue, a formal reminder of Tehran’s red lines.
The meeting in Oman’s capital followed a pattern of using neutral third-party venues and backchannels for sensitive Iran–US diplomacy. Oman has long played this role, hosting exchanges that are deliberately low profile and designed to limit public expectations while testing possibilities. The indirect format — with intermediaries relaying proposals rather than direct Iran–US conversations — reduces immediate incentives for dramatic concessions but can create space for incremental progress.
For international observers the immediate significance is modest: the talks were described as “temporary” and produced no agreement on specific policy changes. Yet the mere resumption of contact matters after years of highly adversarial relations. Even tentative, informal engagement can slow escalation risks, open pathways for future negotiations on sanctions, regional security, or nuclear-related issues, and create diplomatic options that are otherwise closed.
Tehran’s insistence that threats and pressure be removed before substantive progress can be made is both tactical and political. It signals to Washington—and to domestic hardliners—that Iran will seek tangible easing of coercive measures as part of any deeper talks. For Washington, the stance presents a dilemma: offering early concessions risks domestic political blowback, while maintaining maximum pressure may preclude deeper negotiations.
The indirect nature of the talks also increases the role of intermediaries and regional stakeholders. Oman’s facilitation is useful precisely because it offers plausible deniability and a buffer for sensitive exchanges, but it also limits the speed at which concrete, verifiable commitments can be brokered. Neighboring countries and US allies, notably Israel and Gulf Arab states, will watch closely and may attempt to influence the trajectory of any follow-on engagement.
Looking ahead, the most important indicators will be whether the parties agree a timeline for substantive follow-up talks, the scope of issues on the agenda, and whether either side begins to signal reciprocal, verifiable steps. Absent direct meetings or a clear plan for verification and enforcement, progress is likely to be cautious and incremental. Nevertheless, the Muscat talks represent a small but meaningful recalibration from months of frozen or purely adversarial diplomacy.
