On winter mornings from 5,000-metre plateaus to the dark of submarine pens, China’s People’s Liberation Army is portraying a force on the move. Units described as army, navy, air, rocket and information troops are running high-intensity, cross-domain drills: helicopter and fighter units conducting long-range sorties, brigades engaged in red‑blue opposition in extreme cold, a submarine crew practising escape from encirclement, and rocket units rehearsing sustained closed‑camp operations in deep mountain facilities.
The tone of the activity is deliberate. Commanders quoted in state accounts stress a permanent “urgent‑march” posture and a “train-as-you-fight” orientation: training that deliberately mirrors combat conditions, that pushes equipment and personnel to their limits, and that integrates new problem sets — electromagnetic interference, data warfare, and simulated “blue” adversaries that mimic potential opponents’ tactics and systems.
Several features stand out. PLA units are institutionalising more realistic opposition forces: purpose-built blue teams emulate enemy doctrines, weapons performance and tactical thinking to force red forces to discover weaknesses under pressure. Information and network units are moving beyond classroom exercises into simulated ‘data battlefields’ and complex electromagnetic environments, while military aerospace and rocket units stress cross‑domain coordination under degraded communications.
Supervision and measurement have tightened. Training evaluators now use digital terminals to record and rate performance in real time, and combined inspection teams apply “opponent‑perspective” checklists down to the unit and post level. The result, as commanders put it, is a sharper “fightability” profile that turns qualitative slogans into graded, repeatable outputs.
The immediate rationale for this tempo is operational: a string of major exercises and missions scheduled through the year, protracted deployments such as months‑long escort patrols, and the need to validate new tactics and equipment under stress. But the push also serves a second purpose — signalling. Highly visible accounts of intense, modernised training present the PLA as rapidly closing the gap in joint, informationised warfare, messaging capability to regional neighbours and strategic competitors.
For outside observers the implications are mixed. On the one hand, more realistic training that stresses red‑blue friction, cyber and electromagnetic complexity increases PLA proficiency and deterrence. On the other, it raises risks of faster escalation in crises: forces habituated to rapid, high‑tempo operations and experimental tactics are more likely to be emboldened to take assertive action, and more frequent high‑intensity drills increase the chance of accidents or miscalculation.
There are also logistical and institutional limits. Sustaining near‑constant high‑intensity training strains materiel readiness and personnel rotation systems, and units must balance polishing new capabilities with maintaining equipment life cycles. How the PLA manages these trade‑offs will shape whether today’s training surge converts into sustained operational advantage or short‑lived spikes in readiness.
Viewed from the region, the trend is clear: the PLA is prioritising jointness, technological adaptation and realism in training, while turning abstract concepts of “informationised” and “intelligentised” warfare into routine practice. For policymakers and militaries that must respond to Beijing’s moves, the lesson is practical: partner training, maritime and air domain awareness, and resilience against data‑electromagnetic disruption will be increasingly central to deterrence and crisis management.