A coalition of family members of Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic‑bomb survivors convened in Hiroshima on February 7 and adopted a resolution demanding that Japan accede to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The assembly also registered formal protest at moves by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s administration to alter one of the postwar cornerstones of Japan’s security posture, the so‑called "Three Non‑Nuclear Principles."
Earlier this month both Nagasaki and Hiroshima city councils passed opinion statements urging the national government to heed the feelings of atomic‑bomb survivors and to uphold the principles of not possessing, not producing and not permitting the entry of nuclear weapons onto Japanese soil. Those municipal resolutions underscore the continuing moral and political weight carried by the hibakusha community and by the two cities most closely associated with Japan’s nuclear trauma.
The immediate dispute stems from reports that Prime Minister Takaichi is contemplating revisions to Japan’s security documentation — the set of papers that guide alliance policy and defence posture — which could loosen the “no‑import” commitment. That proposal fits into a broader debate inside Tokyo about how far to deepen operational cooperation with the United States and whether to accept more explicit burden‑sharing arrangements amid a more assertive China and repeated North Korean missile and nuclear tests.
Any change to the Three Non‑Nuclear Principles would be highly symbolic and politically combustible. Domestically, it risks alienating a wide swath of public opinion and the hibakusha networks that have long been Japan’s leading moral voices for nuclear abolition. Internationally, an explicit warming to the transit or hosting of nuclear weapons would complicate Japan’s image as a victim‑turned‑advocate for non‑proliferation and could strain ties with neighbouring states while testing the bounds of the US‑Japan alliance.
For now the confrontation is largely about narrative and legitimacy. City councils and survivors’ groups are using institutional levers and public protest to set red lines around national security policy. Whether Prime Minister Takaichi pushes ahead, retreats or seeks a technical compromise in the security documents will determine if this becomes a temporary rows or a defining rupture in Japan’s postwar nuclear norms.