Iran’s foreign minister, Alaghaqi, described indirect talks with the United States in Oman as a “good start” but was explicit about two non-negotiable red lines: the inalienable right to enrich uranium and an absolute refusal to put Iran’s missile programme on the table. He said the dialogue was strictly confined to the nuclear realm and insisted that Iran’s nuclear capabilities are now so embedded that “even bombing cannot destroy” them. Alaghaqi framed the negotiations as technical and limited, while warning that building mutual trust will take a long time given the weight of history between Tehran and Washington.
The setting and form of the contact — mediated, indirect discussions in Oman — are familiar from past efforts to manage US‑Iran tensions without full diplomatic recognition. By publicly spelling out red lines immediately after the talks, Tehran sought both to reassure domestic and regional audiences and to pre-empt any US or Western push to broaden the agenda. The insistence on enrichment as an inherent right echoes language used by Iranian leaders during and after the 2015 nuclear deal, while the categorical rejection of talks on missile systems returns to a long-standing Iranian position linking missiles to sovereign defence.
For Washington and its partners, those positions significantly narrow the scope for a comprehensive bargain. Any American objective that aims to cap or roll back Iran’s enrichment capacity would collide with a declared Iranian red line, while efforts to secure missile constraints would meet outright refusal. That suggests the most realistic near‑term outcome is limited, technical confidence‑building measures focused on monitoring and risk reduction rather than sweeping concessions.
Regionally, the announcement is likely to unsettle Gulf Arab states and Israel, who view both enrichment and ballistic‑missile development as threats to strategic stability. Tehran’s emphasis on the defensive nature of its missile programme will do little to allay those concerns; military planners in the region are apt to interpret the firm public stance as a signal that Iran intends to maintain both deterrent and coercive capabilities while seeking some relief from economic pressure.
Domestically in Iran, the declaration serves multiple political purposes. It allows the government to claim diplomatic engagement without appearing to compromise core sovereignty, placates hardliners wary of concessions to the West, and preserves bargaining chips for any future, more expansive negotiation. What to watch next are the mechanics of follow‑up talks: whether mediators can convert indirect contacts into verifiable, reciprocal steps and whether third parties — European intermediaries, Oman, China or Russia — can help bridge the gap between Washington’s aims and Tehran’s red lines.