A draft agreement reportedly exposed by Israeli sources has revealed that Washington’s negotiating posture toward Tehran goes well beyond nuclear constraints and regional military limits. In addition to demands to roll back Iran’s nuclear programme, transfer highly enriched uranium to third parties and limit missile ranges, the United States is said to have pressed Iran to reduce its crude sales to China — a clause that transforms a bilateral nuclear dialogue into a triangular strategic contest.
The inclusion of oil-export restrictions in a potential US–Iran settlement is striking because it reframes energy as a tool of grand strategy. Beijing is Iran’s largest single market for crude: industry trackers have for years shown China taking the bulk of Iran’s seaborne exports. Reuters and trade-data firms have estimated that, in recent years, China’s daily imports from Iran ran into the low millions of barrels per day and accounted for a meaningful share of Iran’s export revenues and of China’s diversified import mix.
From Washington’s point of view — as the leak implies — pressing Iran to curtail sales to China would serve two purposes. It would squeeze Tehran’s finances and thereby blunt its regional influence, and it would simultaneously aim to weaken a notable element of China’s energy security. The move mirrors previous US efforts to use supply pressure — for example on Venezuelan crude flows to China — as leverage in broader geopolitical competition.
Tehran, however, has limited incentives to accept such a bargain. For the Islamic Republic, missile forces and proxies have been central to deterrence and regional posture for decades; ceding those capabilities would undercut what Iranian leaders regard as existential defences. Cutting sales to China would also be an economic blow at a time when sanctions have already narrowed Tehran’s fiscal room. Domestic politics and the structure of Iran’s security apparatus, notably the Revolutionary Guard, reduce the likelihood of acquiescence to terms perceived as tantamount to surrender.
For Beijing the clause is an unmistakable signal that US diplomacy in the Middle East is shaped as much by competition with China as by regional stability. Yet China has been actively reducing exposure to single-source risk: Moscow, Riyadh, Iraq and Gulf suppliers feature prominently in Beijing’s broader energy strategy, and Beijing maintains substantial strategic petroleum reserves. Those buffers would blunt, though not eliminate, the impact of a forced reduction in Iranian crude.
The strategic consequences of trying to weaponize Iranian oil flows are hazardous. Pushing Tehran to the edge could accelerate its political alignment with Moscow and deepen East–West cleavages, making a de-escalatory outcome harder to achieve. It could also force the United States to expend military and logistical resources in a prolonged regional contest that Washington’s own commentators warn could deplete stocks of interceptors and precision munitions needed elsewhere.
What is most telling about the leak is the signal it sends about US priorities: when negotiating the Middle East’s most volatile dossier, one of Washington’s chief concerns is how outcomes affect its great‑power rivalry with Beijing. The immediate result is likely to be continued brinkmanship — a cycle of limited military actions, intense diplomacy and high-stakes bargaining — rather than a swift settlement. For Beijing, and for other external actors, the episode is a reminder that energy ties in the Middle East are now political instruments as much as commercial relationships.