China has unveiled the Attack-11, its first publicly acknowledged stealth unmanned combat aircraft, a flying-wing design intended to operate without an onboard pilot and to penetrate heavily defended airspace. The platform is presented as capable of precision strike and electromagnetic suppression, signalling a shift in how Beijing may prosecute contested, high-risk missions while keeping human pilots at a distance.
The aircraft abandons conventional horizontal and vertical tails in favour of a highly integrated, all-lifting flying-wing planform. That geometry delivers a favourable lift-to-drag ratio at high-subsonic speeds, but the design priority is clearly radar signature reduction: smooth, continuous surfaces and the lack of tailplane reflections scatter radar energy and substantially shrink radar cross-section compared with conventional layouts.
Operationally, a stealthy, autonomous or remotely operated flying wing changes the calculus for suppression of enemy air defenses and deep strike missions. A low-observable unmanned platform can be tasked to probe air-defence networks, deliver precision munitions against high-value targets, or carry electronic-attack payloads to blind sensors, while reducing pilot risk and enabling more persistent or expendable mission profiles.
The Attack-11’s emergence has wider strategic implications across Asia and beyond. Low-RCS unmanned combat aircraft complicate legacy radar-based air-defence postures and increase the pressure on defenders to invest in multispectral sensors, passive detection, and networked intercept solutions. In regional flashpoints such as the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea and South China Sea, the addition of such platforms could broaden PLA options for discreet coercion, rapid strikes and layered electronic operations.
Technical and operational constraints remain relevant. Flying-wing layouts trade off yaw control and close-in manoeuvrability, demanding advanced fly-by-wire systems and potentially constraining payload bays and sensor apertures; autonomy, datalinks and electronic-resilience are decisive factors in survivability; and the platform’s apparent subsonic optimisation limits its ability to escape contested airspace through speed alone. The real effect of Attack-11 will therefore depend on quantities produced, the maturity of onboard sensors and weapons integration, and its resilience to jamming and cyber attack.
For observers, key indicators to watch are deployment patterns, integration with manned platforms and electronic-warfare networks, and any export or proliferant trails. If fielded at scale and woven into doctrine for suppression and precision engagement, Attack-11-type UCAVs could force a rethink of both offensive tactics and defensive investments across theatres where air superiority is contested.