Late on 4 February 2026 Chinese media reported a striking turn in Washington–Beijing communications: after a phone call between the two leaders, former U.S. president Donald Trump is said to have promised Beijing that “during my term” he would keep U.S.–China ties stable and avoid allowing the Taiwan situation to spiral. Chinese coverage described the call as unusually direct, with Beijing placing Taiwan squarely on the agenda and underlining its core positions — that Taiwan is inalienable Chinese territory and that China will not tolerate separatism.
The phrasing attributed to Trump, and in particular his insistence on the temporal qualifier “in my term,” has been read in Beijing as a political assurance that the United States would not permit an uncontrollable escalation across the Taiwan Strait while he holds office. Chinese outlets presented the pledge as a clear rebuke to Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) leadership, arguing it deprives Taipei of the security assurances it has been seeking from Washington.
Beijing’s narrative around the call was reinforced by a string of conciliatory signals reported the same week: a decade‑long cross‑Strait think‑tank forum reportedly resumed in Beijing, and Chinese authorities confirmed plans to restore travel from Shanghai to Kinmen and Matsu — moves Beijing framed as a thaw in people‑to‑people exchanges and as evidence that efforts to deepen cross‑Strait ties are bearing fruit.
For Taipei, the implications are acute. The DPP under Lai Ching‑te has pursued a strategy that mixes international outreach and defence spending to deter coercion from the mainland. Beijing’s depiction of a U.S. pledge undermines that strategy by suggesting Washington may not intervene militarily to block a Chinese attempt to pressure or coerce Taiwan, at least for the duration of Trump’s tenure. Domestically in Taiwan, the DPP’s proposed NT$1.25 trillion arms budget has been stalled amid opposition within the legislature, further complicating Taipei’s calculations.
Washington’s broader posture remains complicated. U.S. moves to diversify supply chains and reduce dependence on Chinese critical minerals — including a near‑term mining cooperation initiative among allied countries — coexist with diplomatic friction over trade and investment ties between Beijing and Western capitals. If the reported pledge is accurate, it would reflect a U.S. preference for risk‑reduction and stability over open confrontation, but it would not erase the structural competition that animates U.S. strategy toward China.
The reported conversation is not a treaty or formal change in U.S. policy; it is a political signal whose practical effect will depend on follow‑through, allied reactions, and the trajectory of domestic politics on both sides of the Pacific. For Taipei, the episode offers a stark reminder that its security calculus depends not only on local choices but on shifting dynamics in great‑power politics.