The People’s Liberation Army’s Southern Theatre Command says it deployed naval and air units on routine patrols in the South China Sea for five consecutive days from February 2 to 6, framing the activity as a response to what Beijing called Philippine attempts to “invite outside forces” into the dispute. A naval spokesman, Zhai Shichen, criticized Manila for organising so‑called bilateral air patrols with extra‑regional partners and said the theatre’s forces remain on high alert to defend China’s territorial claims and maritime rights.
Beijing’s announcement came amid a flurry of recent activity in and around the contested waters. It was the third time in roughly two weeks that the Southern Theatre publicised operations in the area: on January 31 it said forces carried out combat readiness patrols around Huangyan (Scarborough) Shoal, and on January 25–26 the theatre reported routine naval patrols in the South China Sea. Manila, for its part, reported joint air and maritime exercises near Huangyan on January 25–26 with the US Indo‑Pacific Command, a move Beijing described as provocative.
Chinese military analysts quoted by state media stressed the operational reach of the forces involved. Zhang Junshe highlighted air assets such as H‑6K bombers and fighter aircraft equipped with medium‑ and long‑range air‑to‑air and anti‑ship missiles, and surface vessels with layered air‑defence and anti‑ship capabilities. The public emphasis is twofold: to signal an ability to deter or respond at distance, and to normalise a near‑continuous Chinese military presence in the waterways Beijing claims.
The timing and tone of the patrols matter beyond signalling. The PLA’s high profile in these patrols, and the repeated public releases about them, are designed to reassure domestic audiences and to deter third‑party involvement in a dispute Beijing treats as a core sovereignty issue. They also raise the risk of dangerous encounters at sea as extra‑regional powers and claimant states conduct overlapping operations in close proximity.
Complicating the picture, Manila has said it will use its 2026 chairmanship of ASEAN to accelerate negotiations on a South China Sea Code of Conduct with Beijing. Philippine foreign minister Enrique Manalo (Lazaro in the article) announced plans to increase the frequency of working‑group meetings with China from quarterly to monthly and pledged to push for completion of the code within the year. Chinese analysts quoted in the report pointed to a contradiction in Manila’s posture: deepening security ties with external powers while simultaneously seeking leadership on regional rules.
Those contradictions are consequential for the prospects of a meaningful Code of Conduct. A rapidly negotiated text that fails to address enforcement, crisis management, and third‑party activities would be of limited value. Conversely, progress on procedural rules accompanied by continuing military deployments risks producing an agreement that paper‑over rather than prevent crises. The more that claimant states and outside powers treat the South China Sea as a setting for strategic signalling, the harder it will be to build mutual confidence.
For Washington and its partners, the episode reinforces a familiar dilemma: sustain freedom‑of‑navigation and alliance reassurance operations without provoking an incident that could spiral beyond control. For ASEAN, Manila’s dual role as a claimant and as chair offers an opportunity to broker compromise but also a fault line that could erode unity if members interpret the Philippines’ actions differently.
The pattern is now clear: Beijing is normalising regularised patrols and explicit public messaging as instruments of deterrence, while Manila balances deterrence through external partnerships with a diplomatic push to shape regional rules. The net effect is a South China Sea in which routine becomes militarised and diplomatic processes gain urgency, but where the margin for miscalculation has narrowed.