A U.S.-driven “Peace Committee” convened by President Donald Trump is due to hold its first summit on February 19 to discuss Gaza’s reconstruction, but the initiative has been dogged by hasty preparation and weak international buy‑in. Invitations were only circulated in early February and Washington was still working through basic logistics and participant lists less than two weeks from the meeting, raising doubts about the event’s purpose and practical prospects.
U.S. media portray the gathering more as a large-scale fundraising exercise than the launch of a durable, multilateral reconstruction mechanism. Senior U.S. officials reportedly describe money-raising as one objective, yet the committee lacks a clear operational plan. Jared Kushner, a central architect of the project, has publicly acknowledged that reconstruction hinges on an end to hostilities and offered no alternative roadmap — an admission that underscores the absence of a political or security framework to underpin rebuilding work.
The summit’s timing is complicated by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Washington visit from February 18–22, which overlaps the meeting. Netanyahu has publicly bristled at some U.S. invitations but faces domestic and diplomatic pressure to attend; his presence would mark the first time since October 7, 2023 that he sits at the same table with leaders from parts of the Arab world, lending the gathering symbolic weight even if substantive obstacles remain.
Many established U.S. allies have declined to join the committee. France, Norway, Spain and New Zealand are among those who have said they do not intend to participate, while Italy’s foreign minister explicitly cited constitutional limits on joining an organization led by a single foreign political figure. Israel accepted an invitation but has not formally signed on, and media reports say less than half of the roughly 60 states invited have responded positively.
The initiative has attracted sharp criticism for its potential to bypass or dilute the role of the United Nations and existing multilateral architecture for post‑conflict reconstruction. American outlets and international newspapers have accused the White House of attempting to build a “pay‑to‑play” alternative to established institutions, and observers note the oddity that the draft founding charter circulated with invitations does not even mention Gaza by name.
Practical problems extend beyond optics. Donor coordination for Gaza will require clear security guarantees, credible plans for demilitarization that parties accept, and enforceable oversight arrangements to prevent funds fueling further violence. None of those elements is in place: Washington has not presented a viable approach to disarm Hamas, and Palestinians — who must be central to any reconstruction — have limited formal input into a U.S.-led body that many governments view as politically motivated.
If the summit goes ahead in its current form, it is likely to produce modest pledges and publicity rather than a transformative funding and governance package. A narrow, U.S.-centric mechanism risks fragmenting donor efforts and weakening the authority of the UN agencies already operating in Gaza, while also reducing incentives for Israel and other regional actors to agree difficult security and political compromises.
Beyond immediate reconstruction, the episode is revealing of a broader strategic ambition: the Trump administration is seeking to reconfigure international problem‑solving by assembling ad hoc coalitions under U.S. leadership. The poor reception from established allies, however, highlights the limits of that approach when credibility, neutrality and broad legitimacy are prerequisites for success in a deeply contested post‑conflict environment.