This week Tehran combined conciliatory language about indirect nuclear talks with unmistakably hard-line military signals, underscoring a deliberate two‑track strategy intended to buy diplomatic space while protecting core national interests.
On February 9 the Iranian president delivered a public address framing diplomacy as conditional on respect for sovereignty, international law and mutual benefit, and signalled that indirect talks with the United States offer an opportunity for a fair deal. Within 24 hours Iran’s national security secretary visited Oman — a known regional intermediary — while the Iranian air force declared a maximum state of readiness and vowed to respond to any aggression.
The juxtaposition of outreach and deterrence is not accidental. As Qin Tian, deputy director of the Middle East Institute at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, argued in a commentary published alongside the reporting, Tehran’s posture is a rational attempt to combine negotiation with firm defence of red lines. Iran is signalling willingness to discuss the nuclear file while keeping pressure points — missile development, regional influence and military preparedness — visibly intact.
Washington, however, has continued to lean on Tehran. The administration has maintained unilateral restrictions and pressure even after indirect talks resumed on February 6, reflecting a negotiating posture that seeks maximal Iranian concessions. That posture, Qin warns, carries risks: squeezing Iran too hard could prompt retaliatory action or a breakdown in talks that returns both sides to a dangerous pre‑negotiation standoff.
Israel sits uneasily between these dynamics. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s planned visit to Washington this week is timed to reinforce Israeli red lines and to coordinate with the United States on both deterrence and diplomacy. Qin notes that Israel’s demands on nuclear and missile constraints are stricter than America’s, and that encouraging U.S. pressure on Iran is Israel’s preferred course — but that insistence could make a negotiated outcome impossible if the U.S. accepts wholly Israeli terms.
Qin offers a pragmatic road map for avoiding that impasse: treat the nuclear file as the best candidate for an early, limited bargain; mutually withdraw some pressure‑building measures to improve the negotiating atmosphere; and expand the diplomatic table to include other influential actors who can mediate and help verify compliance. Each step aims to produce incremental, verifiable gains rather than an all‑or‑nothing bargain that neither side can accept.
Why this matters: the immediate stakes are regional security and the prospect of a resurgent nuclear crisis. A negotiated, limited agreement on nuclear constraints would reduce the likelihood of military escalation and create space for broader diplomacy; conversely, continued pressure without reciprocal confidence measures could push Iran toward escalation or hardened refusal. For Washington, Jerusalem and regional capitals, the question is whether they will calibrate pressure to extract concessions or apply it to the point where diplomacy collapses.
The coming days — with Oman shuttling messages, U.S.‑Israeli coordination intensifying, and Iran’s forces on heightened alert — will test whether a cautious, reciprocal approach can be stitched together, or whether the two‑track strategy resolves into confrontation.