Yijing Photovoltaic, once hailed as the “first A‑share solar module” company, has been thrust into a formal pre‑restructuring process after creditors moved to have the group reorganised, triggering an immediate delisting warning under Shanghai Stock Exchange rules. The filings, lodged in early February, mark the latest and most visible sign of distress for a company that has struggled for years amid a brutal industry downturn.
Two suppliers — Jieyang Energy and Kaino Aluminium — asked the Changzhou Intermediate People’s Court to put Yijing and its subsidiary, Changzhou Yijing, into judicial reorganisation, and to register a pre‑restructuring record before any formal acceptance. The notices show Yijing owes the first creditor roughly 8.43 million yuan and the second about 6.03 million yuan for equipment and auxiliary materials, respectively; those relatively modest sums are symptomatic of much wider balance‑sheet stress.
The company’s recent financials explain why small creditor claims have become existential. In 2024 Yijing reported revenue of 34.78 billion yuan, a 57% year‑on‑year fall, with a parent‑company net loss of 20.90 billion yuan. Management now warns of a further 4.5–6.0 billion yuan net loss in 2025 and forecasts negative equity of between 68 million and 130 million yuan by year‑end, illustrating that the group’s liabilities have outpaced cash generation.
Legal exposure has compounded the cash squeeze. Yijing disclosed 58 litigation and arbitration cases in 2025 with aggregate claims of about 227.56 million yuan, the majority filed against the company. At the same time, a local government authority in Anhui’s Quanjiao County is seeking to unwind a stalled 10GW‑scale investment project and recover 140 million yuan of advance capital after the firm failed to deliver on construction and subsequent production targets.
Under Shanghai Stock Exchange rules a court acceptance of a reorganisation petition would force an immediate market warning and could lead to delisting if restructuring fails and bankruptcy follows. Yijing has warned investors that acceptance of a court filing would trigger a delisting risk alert, and that a failed reorganisation could end in liquidation and termination of listing — outcomes that would wipe out equity value and severely affect unsecured creditors and suppliers.
Yijing’s plight is rooted in sector‑wide dynamics. China’s crystalline silicon photovoltaic industry has endured cyclical oversupply, sharp price competition and a recent period of structural capacity mismatch. Policymakers and industry groups have begun to push for “de‑involution” and capacity rationalisation, but the inertia of previously expanded capacity means oversupply and weak margins persist, leaving smaller and mid‑tier manufacturers vulnerable.
The immediate future will hinge on three variables: whether the court accepts the creditors’ restructuring petitions, the terms creditors and stakeholders can negotiate in a pre‑restructuring plan, and whether state or strategic investors intervene. For bondholders, suppliers and minority shareholders the window to salvage value is narrow; asset sales or an orchestrated takeover are possible outcomes, but a messy liquidation remains a credible risk if capital support cannot be mobilised.
Yijing’s case is a reminder that industry consolidation in Chinese solar manufacturing is accelerating and that judicial and administrative remedies are becoming a more frequent mechanism for resolving corporate distress. Investors and counterparties should watch court filings, any public restructuring proposal, and local government decisions on the Chuzhou project as bellwethers for how China’s solar supplier landscape will reshape over the next 12–24 months.
