On February 6, 2026, the United States announced a decisive shift in its arms-export policy, replacing a decades-old "first-come, first-served" approach with a prioritisation scheme that favours buyers who spend more on defence and those judged strategically important to U.S. interests. The change formally ties weapons transfers more tightly to geopolitics and budgetary heft, signaling that access to American systems will be rationed according to Washington's strategic calculus.
Tying export decisions to national interest and defence spending alters the mechanics of alliance management. Recipients that are large defence spenders or occupy key positions in Washington's rivalry with great powers will see faster approvals and firmer commitments. Conversely, smaller partners or purchasers with limited defence budgets may find themselves delayed or deprioritised, even if they have relied on predictable procurement windows for years.
The policy recalibration has immediate implications for theatres from Eastern Europe to the Indo-Pacific and the Gulf. Countries long accustomed to steady flows of U.S. materiel will now have to demonstrate strategic value or expand defence budgets to stay near the front of the queue. That dynamic raises questions about predictable support for partners such as Ukraine or Taiwan, where political backing has been strong but defence-spending metrics and competing priorities vary.
Beyond bilateral ties, the announcement will reshape the global arms market. Washington's greater selectivity creates commercial opportunities for other suppliers—principally Russia, China, and certain European exporters—that are willing to sell on different terms or to customers the U.S. downgrades. It also increases the geopolitical leverage of arms policy: the United States can use access to its advanced systems as both carrot and stick, but at the cost of making arms sales an even more explicit instrument of coercion and diplomacy.
Operationally, defence companies and allied procurement offices will face renewed uncertainty. A prioritisation regime can accelerate delivery for some programmes while squeezing supply chains and budgets for others, complicating industrial planning and stockpiling. It also elevates the strategic logic behind allied defence spending, making higher budgets a pathway not only to capability but to political favour with Washington.
The change is less a tactical tweak than a strategic recalibration. By making arms exports contingent on perceived national interest and defence outlays, Washington is formalising a trade-off between predictability for partners and the leverage of a hegemonic supplier. The result will be a more politicised market in which alliances are reinforced by money and geostrategy, and where states that cannot or will not meet Washington's new criteria look elsewhere for weapons and security guarantees.