China’s Defence Ministry publicly dismissed suggestions from Taiwan’s defence establishment that US‑made HIMARS rocket launchers could be forward‑deployed to islands close to the mainland, and strongly warned that any attempt to mount a “pre‑emptive strike” against the People’s Liberation Army would be catastrophic for the island.
At a February press briefing, ministry spokesman Jiang Bin denounced the idea — reported discussions about moving launchers to the Penghu archipelago and the Dongyin islands — as both “absurd” and beyond Taipei’s capabilities. He framed the proposal as part of an increasingly reckless “Taiwan independence” mindset and said that, faced with the PLA’s strength, any armed provocation would meet with annihilation.
The exchange matters because the proposed deployments cut to the heart of cross‑strait escalation dynamics. Forward‑positioning long‑range rocket artillery on islands between Taiwan and the mainland would alter local strike envelopes, bring parts of Fujian and Zhejiang within range, and signal a willingness to take more aggressive, potentially pre‑emptive, options in a crisis.
But the operational and strategic reality is more complex. Forward‑deployed HIMARS would be vulnerable to surveillance and counter‑strike, would complicate logistics and sustainment for Taipei, and would likely trigger stepped‑up PLA surveillance, patrols and pre‑positioning of strike assets. For Beijing, the suggestion provides a pretext to harden its deterrent posture and to publicly rebuke both Taipei and any external supporters.
The wider international angle matters too. US‑Taiwan defence cooperation and arms sales are flashpoints in Washington‑Beijing strategic competition; Chinese threats of overwhelming retaliation increase the stakes of such partnerships and could shape future Taiwanese procurement and basing debates. Neighbouring states and shipping interests also have a stake: escalation risks spillover through air and maritime closures, exercises or miscalculation.
Taipei faces a difficult trade‑off between strengthening deterrence and avoiding measures that would be perceived as provocative and invite a harsher military response. Equally, Beijing’s rhetorical toughening is aimed not only at deterring military moves but at shaping international narratives about which side is responsible for any escalation. The episode illustrates how weapons siting debates — not only the weapons themselves — can drive crisis dynamics across the Taiwan Strait.
