Chinese media recently reported that a People's Liberation Army (PLA) aviation brigade equipped with fourth‑and‑a‑half generation J‑16 fighters managed to lock onto and drive away a U.S. F‑22 stealth fighter during a training encounter, and that Su‑30s in the same formation were able to acquire a low‑observable aircraft. If taken at face value, the episode is striking because it suggests China is increasingly comfortable publicizing instances where older or non‑fifth‑generation platforms perform credibly against advanced stealth aircraft.
The significance lies less in any single radar lock than in the operational picture the report sketches: a layered, networked force combining fighters, airborne early‑warning, ground radars and electronic warfare that can extend sensor range and create opportunities for engagement even when facing a stealthy opponent. Modern sensors and datalinks can reduce the advantage stealth provides by fusing lower‑quality contacts into a usable track; the PLA has been investing heavily in that fusion, alongside electronic attack and collaborative tactics.
Historically, fifth‑generation fighters such as the F‑22 have relied on low observability, advanced radar, and sensor fusion to operate with considerable freedom. Western exercises and analyses have shown steep exchange ratios in environments favorable to stealth and sensor superiority. That makes the PLA’s narrative—where Su‑30s and J‑16s play an active role in tracking or expelling stealth fighters—notable because it emphasizes doctrine and systems over single‑airframe performance.
Technical caveats matter. The Su‑30 is an older, non‑stealth design, reliant on Russian‑origin radar and weaponry that lag the very latest Western systems. A reported ability to detect or threaten a stealth jet does not imply parity in a contested, full‑spectrum battle. Many plausible explanations exist: the encounter may have been constrained by rules of engagement, electronic support measures could have degraded stealth performance, bistatic or multistatic radar geometries may have been exploited, or the aircraft could have been cued by other sensors.
Politically and strategically, the episode serves multiple purposes. Domestically it bolsters narratives of steady progress in PLA modernization and reassures audiences that current forces can be effective while newer indigenous fighters mature. Internationally, it signals to rivals and regional neighbors that China is prioritizing integrated air‑defense and battle‑network capabilities rather than relying solely on platform upgrades.
For military planners and policy‑makers outside China, the lesson is twofold. First, airborne stealth is a powerful advantage but not an invulnerability; adversaries can narrow margins through integration of sensors, electronic warfare and intelligent tactics. Second, continued PLA emphasis on networking legacy platforms into a coherent system increases the complexity of deterrence and crisis management in the Indo‑Pacific, complicating assumptions about how air superiority will be achieved or contested in future encounters.