On 17 February Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei publicly rebuffed American objections to Tehran’s missile programme, saying the types and ranges of weapons Iran chooses to possess are an internal matter. He framed Washington’s demands as inappropriate interference and doubled down with a rhetorical flourish: while the United States boasts the world’s most powerful military, such strength can be struck hard enough to be unable to rise again.
Khamenei’s remarks came amid repeated U.S. declarations of naval presence in and around the Gulf, including assertions that carrier strike groups are patrolling near Iranian waters. He argued that the more dangerous element than a carrier itself is the array of weapons capable of sending it to the seabed, an allusion to anti-ship missiles, submarine warfare and other asymmetric tools Tehran has highlighted in recent years.
The comment is both declaratory and strategic. Since the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear accord and the imposition of sweeping sanctions, Iran has invested in long-range missile development and a suite of asymmetric capabilities intended to offset American conventional superiority. Washington and its Gulf partners view limits on missile range and precision as central to curbing Tehran’s regional coercion; Tehran views those limits as a curtailment of sovereign deterrence.
Militarily, the threat is credible enough to shape behaviour. Iran has developed anti-ship ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, fast-attack craft, sea mines and a growing drone fleet, while its naval units, including submarines, have conducted increasingly assertive patrols in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Such capabilities complicate the calculus for U.S. carrier operations, increase the cost of projecting power, and raise the stakes for any military confrontation that could imperil commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.
Politically, Khamenei’s rhetoric serves multiple audiences. Domestically it projects strength and sovereignty; regionally it reassures allied militias and partner states that Tehran intends to deter U.S. pressure; internationally it signals that hard limits on Iran’s missile forces will be difficult to extract without broader concessions. For Washington and its partners the statement underscores the persistent friction between deterrence-minded military posturing and the diplomatic space needed for de‑escalation or negotiated constraints.