A senior Iranian security official said on February 26 that a rapid agreement with Washington is possible if the core of indirect talks is limited to securing Iran’s publicly stated pledge not to pursue nuclear weapons. The remarks by Ali Shamkhani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, came on the sidelines of a third round of indirect U.S.–Iran negotiations in Geneva, mediated by Oman and held at Oman’s diplomatic mission.
The Geneva session, which paused for intra-delegation consultations and was reported to include International Atomic Energy Agency director Rafael Grossi as a technical observer, underscores the technical and political complexity of any breakthrough. Shamkhani argued that if the negotiations focus on Iran’s already-declared policy of not seeking a nuclear weapon, both sides could “rapidly” reach an accord that aligns with Iran’s stated military doctrine and leadership guidance.
Those remarks offer a window into Tehran’s preferred negotiating frame: anchor any agreement on public statements and doctrinal commitments rather than on extended, intrusive constraints. That stance appeals to Iranian leaders because it emphasizes sovereignty and public political commitments, but it collides with Western demands for verifiable limits and monitoring of enrichment levels, stockpiles and centrifuge infrastructure.
The talks are the latest attempt to revive a diplomatic track that has been strained since the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear accord and the return of harsh sanctions. Iran’s programme has advanced since then—higher enrichment levels and an expanded stockpile have shortened any theoretical “breakout” time—so Western capitals insist that any deal needs concrete, time-bound steps and unfettered inspections to restore confidence.
The presence of the IAEA director as a technical observer is significant: the agency supplies the technical verification that underpins any credible agreement. Grossi’s role could help bridge political statements and the scientific, inspection-based measures the U.S. and its partners will demand; yet Tehran’s past cooperation with the IAEA has been episodic, and unresolved questions about undeclared material and access remain politically sensitive.
Oman’s mediation and the indirect format reflect the diplomatic realities: Washington and Tehran still lack formal channels for direct engagement, and both sides face hardline constituencies that can scuttle compromises. For the United States, sanctions relief will likely be conditional on verifiable Iranian rollbacks; for Iran, public recognition of its doctrine against nuclear weapons is an important political accommodation but may not substitute for the material concessions it seeks.
A deal remains possible, but only if both sides bridge the gap between rhetorical assurances and rigorous verification. Shamkhani’s comments indicate Tehran’s willingness to make a declarative concession, but Western negotiators will press for measures that turn that declaration into demonstrable behaviour. Expect progress to hinge on technical inspections, sequencing of sanctions relief, and the domestic politics that shape each capital’s negotiating bandwidth.