Shen Minggao, a veteran economist who previously served as global chief economist at Guangfa Securities and as Citi’s Greater China chief economist, has outlined a bold proposal to broaden household ownership of China’s emerging tech champions. In a recent interview with NetEase’s financial think-tank programme, he argued that converting gains from “new-quality” productive forces into broadly held equity is the best way to revive consumption and share the benefits of technological progress.
Shen frames his proposal against what he terms China’s current “turning period” — a painful structural transition as old growth drivers such as real estate recede while new drivers like advanced technology remain nascent. He places particular emphasis on nominal GDP as the signal to watch, noting that China’s nominal growth has slowed to roughly 4% in 2025 and that low inflation or even disinflation (negative PPI, CPI near zero) reflects a demand shortfall rather than a supply constraint.
To address that demand shortfall, Shen recommends a three-part policy package to turn tech gains into household wealth: a state-run education development fund that credits newborns with long-term tech-asset accounts; a national livelihood development fund to allow working adults to participate; and a reform that links a portion of pension assets to tech-related investments. Operationally, the proposal envisages a government-curated “tech ETF whitelist” covering sectors such as artificial intelligence, innovative pharmaceuticals and new energy, within which citizens can select instruments subject to a minimum ten-year holding commitment.
Crucially, Shen suggests that the state act as a junior loss-absorber, effectively providing a ten-year floor on returns — he cited a target of not less than 3% annualised over a decade — a level above typical deposit rates. The state would sit behind private investors in the loss-absorption hierarchy, aiming to reduce political resistance to market exposure while providing households with confidence to hold illiquid, long-term equity positions.
Shen’s logic links two policy objectives: boost consumption by increasing households’ property-like income streams, and efficiently finance the scaling of high-tech firms without relying solely on corporate or bank financing. He argues that diversified tech ETFs reduce single-firm risk, and over a long horizon a small number of large-cap tech firms could emerge to validate the approach and produce significant wealth effects.
The plan has immediate attractions: it speaks directly to China’s “common prosperity” narrative by expanding asset ownership, and to policymakers’ need to rebuild domestic demand without re-inflating real-estate bubbles. It also offers a politically palatable route to channel public support to strategic sectors and to deepen domestic capital markets while nurturing national champions.
But the design contains serious trade-offs. A state-guaranteed floor creates contingent fiscal liabilities and moral-hazard risks: if the state effectively backstops long-term equity returns, investor discipline is weakened and the public balance sheet becomes exposed to equity-market cycles. Implementation would also hinge on credible governance of the ETF whitelist, transparent selection criteria, and robust legal firewalls between guarantee mechanisms and operational discretion.
Internationally, the proposal would send mixed signals. On one hand, greater retail participation in tech equity could deepen China’s capital markets and reduce firms’ reliance on shadow banking or opaque state financing. On the other, a visible state backstop for equities may alarm foreign investors about market distortions and could complicate cross-border portfolio flows and valuation norms. Ultimately, the idea is a reflection of a broader Chinese policy impulse: use institutional innovation to square the circle between market development, social equity and macro stabilisation.