At the start of the new year several J-16s lifted off in a coordinated sortie that Chinese state-affiliated outlets presented as a multi-mission, combat-realistic exercise combining reconnaissance, coordinated penetration and joint strike tasks. Footage released alongside official commentary for the first time shows an apparent mixed formation of J-16D electronic-warfare variants, an attack-11 stealth unmanned combat aerial vehicle and J-20 stealth fighters flying together — a visual cue for a more networked, heterogeneous force architecture.
Commanders involved in the exercise described a deliberate move away from single-type drills toward persistent, cross-unit data-linking and an integrated command platform that shares situational awareness in real time. The service framed the sortie as an early demonstration of “systemic” combat power, and said it will institutionalize cross-domain joint training and multi-element, multi-mission collaborative drills to sharpen doctrine and tactics.
Chinese military analysts and the exercise commentary outlined representative task-group combinations now being rehearsed: cross-generation air-superiority packages pairing J-16s with J-20s; suppression-of-enemy-air-defenses (SEAD) groupings involving J-16, J-16D and J-35A types to open avenues for follow-on forces; J-16–J-35A strike packages for deep precision strikes against maritime and ground targets; and manned–unmanned mixed teams in which crewed fighters shepherd intelligent loyal-wingman drones. The coverage also noted integration with airborne early-warning platforms, bombers, surface warships and ground air-defence units to form layered kill chains across air, sea and land.
This publicized training reveals a doctrinal emphasis rather than an equipment novelty: the J-16, a heavy, twin-seat, multirole strike fighter developed from older Sukhoi-derived designs, is being repurposed as a flexible node in China’s growing networked force. The J-16D variant and stealth assets such as the J-20 supply electronic-attack and penetration capabilities, while unmanned wingmen extend reach and risk transfer. Together they reflect China’s push toward ‘system-of-systems’ operations similar in concept to other militaries’ network-centric or manned–unmanned teaming experiments.
The operational significance is straightforward. Networked mixed-pack formations make it harder for an opponent to identify high-value nodes and sever an engagement chain, raising the bar for adversary air-defence suppression and counter-targeting. For regional contingencies — most immediately scenarios around Taiwan and disputed maritime zones — such mixed formations could enable deeper, more protected strikes and more resilient command-and-control under contested-spectrum conditions.
But the evolution is not without limits. Effective datalinked operations require secure, robust command networks, resilient electronic-warfare defences and intensive logistics and training to synchronize disparate airframes and sensors. They also create new vulnerabilities: sophisticated jamming, cyber-attacks or kinetic strikes on sensor and comms nodes could blunt the very advantage such networks seek to provide. For outside observers, the demonstration signals capability maturation, a doctrinal shift toward complex, multi-domain kill chains, and a likely acceleration in both Chinese repetition of these drills and in regional countermeasures.
Publicizing mixed formations that pair legacy strike fighters with stealth platforms and unmanned systems is as much about signalling as it is about tactics. The footage and the language used by commanders underscore Beijing’s intent to normalize joint, networked training and to present a picture of operational depth to domestic and foreign audiences. Expect similar public exercises to become more frequent as the People’s Liberation Army refines procedures, hardens command systems and seeks to operationalize mixed-force concepts at scale.