Narendra Modi concluded a high‑profile two‑day visit to Israel on February 26, elevating bilateral ties to a “special strategic partnership” and declaring in the Israeli parliament that India stands with Israel “now and in the future.” The visit came at a sensitive moment: Gaza remains under intense Israeli military pressure and international institutions have levelled grave accusations of atrocities that have made Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu politically vulnerable at home and abroad. Modi’s public display of solidarity and the flurry of agreements signed in Jerusalem immediately provoked fierce debate across India and alarmed several regional capitals.
The two governments announced 16 memoranda and agreements, mapped out a defence cooperation roadmap and promised to fast‑track talks on a free trade agreement. Indian media and Western outlets have reported that the visit could culminate in a major defence package — variously valued at around $10 billion — that would include Israeli air‑defence and directed‑energy technology, building on some $20.5 billion of Israeli arms purchases by India since 2020. The trip was explicitly presented as an economic and security partnership aimed at innovation, technology transfer and strengthening deterrence capabilities.
Israel staged elaborate diplomatic choreography: the Israeli parliament bestowed one of its highest honours on Modi, Netanyahu accompanied him to the airport and the two leaders embraced in public. The optics bolstered Netanyahu at home, where he is contesting elections amid mounting legal and international pressure, and signalled to allies that Israel still commands significant diplomatic backing. The warmth of the reception underscored how Beijing’s rivals and partners alike are ready to convert political intimacy into tangible cooperation.
The visit provoked immediate and sharp criticism inside India. The principal opposition Congress party accused Modi of abandoning India’s long‑standing support for Palestinian self‑determination and its image as a champion of “peace and justice,” while left parties described the visit as complicity in what they called a campaign of violence against Palestinians. Critics objected not only to the strategic tilt but to Modi’s failure to address the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza during his Knesset speech, framing the trip as a moral as well as a geopolitical misstep.
Regional reactions were equally pointed. Iran’s foreign minister publicly called it unfortunate that India would deepen ties with what he termed a regime committing atrocities in Gaza, and Pakistani leaders condemned what they described as a double standard on civilian suffering. Gulf and broader Middle Eastern states, which are important economic partners for New Delhi, watched nervously: many have expanded commercial ties with India while also maintaining political sensitivities over Palestine.
The visit reflects a deliberate pivot that blends ideology, security needs and commercial interests. New Delhi’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party shares strands of ideological affinity with Israel’s right, and India’s security establishment values Israeli intelligence, counter‑terrorism and defence technology. At the same time, the government appears willing to accept diplomatic friction with Iran and unease among Muslim‑majority states to secure advanced weaponry and supply‑chain links critical for India’s military modernization and technological ambitions.
The fallout will test India’s diplomatic dexterity. Modi gains a closer security partner and potential access to niche technologies that could accelerate India’s defence capabilities, but the political cost at home and reputational cost abroad are real. If New Delhi cannot reassure Gulf energy suppliers, rehabilitate ties with Iran, or maintain its traditional image as a mediator that respects Palestinian rights, the short‑term strategic gains may be offset by longer‑term friction in a region that remains central to India’s trade and energy security.