A joint US‑Israeli campaign entered its third day on March 2, as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared in a filmed address that the fight will continue “as long as it takes.” His message — and his call for Iranians to topple their government — encapsulate a strategy that blends military maximalism with political theater. What it does not resolve is whether this is a calculated, long‑term plan or a desperate bid to preserve a political career.
Netanyahu has been Israel’s dominant political figure for four decades, returning repeatedly from political setbacks and steering the country through multiple crises. Today, however, he faces perhaps his most complicated moment: a fractious coalition, a protracted judicial battle at home and lingering international condemnation over the Gaza campaign. In that context, a campaign aiming at Iran’s highest leadership carries both strategic logic and grave personal stakes.
Targeted killings have long been an instrument of Israeli security policy, used against militant leaders and selected Iranian figures over many years. In Netanyahu’s calculus, striking at the supreme leader would be a natural, if extreme, extension of that doctrine. But assassinating or attempting to kill the head of an internationally recognised sovereign state — and a theocratic system that has endured for decades — is an entirely different order of risk.
Iran’s Islamic Republic is not a personality cult wrapped around a single man, but a layered political system combining clerical authority, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and institutionalised ideological legitimacy. That architecture has survived war, sanctions and recurring domestic turbulence, which makes the simple “decapitation equals collapse” formula highly uncertain. If Khamenei were removed, the succession is more likely to consolidate hardline power backed by the IRGC than to produce a peaceful transition aligned with Western hopes.
Netanyahu’s ability to execute this operation depended crucially on strategic cover from Washington. The deployment of carrier strike groups and substantial US firepower provided the operational shield Israel required and represented a major diplomatic achievement for Jerusalem. That backing, however, is contingent on US domestic politics and assessments of the campaign’s costs; a shift in Washington’s appetite for sustained escalation would leave Israel to shoulder far greater burdens alone.
There has also been no publicly presented, decisive evidence showing Iran was on the verge of an imminent nuclear breakthrough that could not be delayed by non‑kinetic measures. Even if the immediate military aim is achieved, history cautions that air strikes alone are rarely sufficient to produce stable, externally engineered regime change. Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 2011 show how removing a regime’s head or top echelons can unmoor state institutions and unleash protracted conflict.
On the battlefield, Iran’s initial responses have already tested Netanyahu’s assumptions: missile attacks on Israeli territory and US bases, threats to Gulf energy infrastructure and warnings over the Strait of Hormuz point to a conflict that radiates regionally rather than remaining contained. Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE are watching anxiously; their concerns about escalation will constrain diplomatic options and complicate Washington’s ability to sustain a unified front.
Netanyahu’s gamble offers him a possible historic redemption if it ends with a diminished Iranian threat and bolstered Israeli security. But the stakes are existentially large: a miscalculation could embroil Israel in a long, costly conflict and permanently alter regional alignments. Tactical gains at the outset, however dramatic, will not determine the war’s meaning; the endgame — shaped by successor politics in Tehran, sustained American involvement and regional responses — will.